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Executive Summary  
This report provides guidelines with respect to concepts, rationales and methodological 
considerations aimed at experts conducting territorial reviews of industrial transition and at policy 
makers and analysts with an interest in the operationalisation of transformative industrial 
innovation. It explains the concepts necessary to adopt a wider framing of the production and 
consumption system, the rationales for (and objectives of) reviews useful for transformative 
industrial innovation, and the POINT (Projecting Opportunities for INdustrial Transitions) 
methodology presented as a series of steps. The report is meant as a resource to be consulted 
continuously throughout the process a review. 
The concepts section outlines a framework that allows Smart Specialisation Strategies (S3) to be 
mobilised in ways that are in keeping with vanguard thinking and international practice on system 
innovation and new industrial policies.  Doing so requires reframing the domain of policy action, 
broadening it to cover the entire production and consumption system. When a wider view of the 
production and consumption system is taken, previously unidentified interconnections between its 
constituent parts can become obvious. Importantly, these interconnections represent points of 
powerful policy leverage, if their identification enables coordinated and timely action. Successful 
transition management requires strategic directions that draw upon territorial values (in addition to 
economic strengths); a concern with multiple-value creation (economic, social, environmental); the 
management of demand (public procurement, households); understanding and managing resistance 
to change; and ways of satisfying the very different needs and ambitions of a great number of 
actors with unequal power over the system. 
The rationales section argues that transitions require clarity of purpose and a new paradigm of 
thinking and acting in the face of transformative change. A confluence of maturing trends, including 
the availability of funding and an increasing readiness to deploy the full panoply of industrial policy 
instruments, can allow territories to benefit from new opportunities, identify new strengths and 
manage the threats. As deep structural change is often accompanied by social transformation, 
these transitions represent a chance not just to cater for the economic growth imperative but also 
to respond to growing social demands to maintain dignified, fulfilling, and well-remunerated 
employment, empower traditionally disadvantaged groups and achieve sustainability. However, this 
is not a likely outcome in the absence of preparation and a preparedness to act. Obtaining 
legitimacy and resources for pursuing transformative change requires alternative framings as to 
why and how policy can yield desirable outcomes. The section also explains how the perspective 
taken has been motivated by the needs of lagging and other regions that suffer from long-term 
lock-in to economic activities with limited opportunities for diversification within predictable 
timeframes. For these, as well as many other regions, new pathways for industrial development 
supported by multi-level coordination, planning and interventions are necessary.  The territorial 
reviews can produce relevant evidence that is difficult to obtain otherwise.  
The section on the POINT methodology presents suggestions on the framing, procedure and 
conduct of the reviews. The reviews focus on an industrial theme of growing global importance 
suggested by the relevant territorial authorities (for instance, but not confined to: climate 
change/renewable energy; electrification of transport; circular economy; digitalisation; artificial 
intelligence). The purpose of the reviews is to collect evidence and examine the scope for 
developing adequate territorial responses that harness cross-portfolio complementarities (e.g. 
between ministries and between levels of governance) and cross-stakeholder coordination (e.g. 
between businesses and broad constituencies of consumers/users). In each territory under review 
and for an industrial theme suggested by the authorities the review findings are documented in a 
report that serves to:  
(a) Map the affected orientation, resource mobilisation, production and consumption 
systems in the territory; 
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(b) Document existing planning arrangements and directions of deliberate change (e.g. as 
described in thematic policy and business strategies, or evident in momentum-gathering 
social concerns and movements, consumer trends, common territorial values etc.) of various 
stakeholders in the affected systems that could later form the basis for a broadly-
supported transition vision; 
(c) Make concrete suggestions for the advancement of the transition and for managing its 
downsides. Given the nature and magnitude of the transition challenge, adequate territorial 
responses will include not just research and innovation policies that are already part of S3, 
but also industrial and employment policies more generally, including provisions for 
education and skills, for complementary large public infrastructures (e.g. in energy, 
transport, waste), urban planning, fiscal policy and social security reform, among others. The 
recommendations of the review therefore place a particular emphasis on fostering 
alignment and coordination within government. 
The reviews aim to build the evidence base for appropriate “Actions to Manage Industrial 
Transitions”, as stipulated in fulfilment criterion No.6 of the enabling condition of good governance 
foreseen in the next multi-annual financing period of the EU Structural Funds (without prejudice to 
the final decision of the European Commission). The reviews can further inform the design and 
implementation of S3 [e.g. refining or extending priorities, broadening the Entrepreneurial Discovery 
Process (EDP), fostering synergies with other funding streams] as well as informing, and been 
informed by, industrial policies and other territorial strategies for economic, social and sustainable 
development. More broadly, the reviews can be an input to a participatory process of stakeholder 
engagement leading to the development of credible positive visions for the future that can be the 
source of pride and inspiration for the region (or country) and a rallying point for the mobilisation of 
actors and resources from all levels.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and background  
Powerful global impulses are calling for transformative change of our economies and societies. 
Digitalisation stands to re-define the global industrial landscape, opening up new areas of economic 
possibility, bringing radical change in the nature of work, and doubts about the future of entire 
professions. The future of work is also shaped by Europe’s demographic transition, which, 
characterised by an ageing workforce, is strengthening the drive towards automation but can also 
have profound implications for business dynamism (Engbom, 2018; Jones, 2020). Moreover, a 
profound transition of our energy systems is currently under way, with renewable energy entering a 
phase of rapid deployment driven by declining costs and fuelling an associated revolution in 
transport and other energy-intensive industries. Above all, however, responding to the climate 
emergency (European Parliament, 2019) is the defining challenge of our time. The climate 
emergency is not the only indication that human activity is overstepping planetary boundaries: 
indicators of biosphere integrity, land-system change and biochemical cycles of phosphorus and 
nitrogen are already beyond critical levels (Steffen et al., 2015; EEA, 2019).  
These global impulses are upsetting deep-rooted certainties. They require clarity of purpose and a 
new paradigm of thinking and acting in the face of transformative change. The European Union has 
risen to the challenge with the recently launched European Green Deal (EC, 2019; EC, 2020a), a 
strategy to transform European industry and society that is unprecedented in its scope, boldness 
and clarity of purpose. The twin transitions foreseen in the Green Deal – towards digitalisation1 and 
sustainable growth accompanied by a pledge to secure climate neutrality by 2050 – translate these 
global impulses into an economic growth strategy for Europe that strives to be technologically 
progressive, environmentally sustainable and socially just. Besides offering sorely needed global 
leadership in the protection of the collective interest of humankind, the Green Deal provides long-
term political and legal certainty, and substantial resources to EU member states to reap the 
opportunities and plan against the threats of these inevitable transitions. Adequate responses, 
however, will have to be tailored to the needs and limitations of each territory. 
In July 2019 the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission within the frame of the project 
RIS3 Support to Lagging Regions2 launched a Working Group3 on Understanding and Managing 
Industrial Transitions4. The aim of this Working Group is to support member state authorities facing 
major industrial transitions, away from declining sectors and activities and charting actionable 
paths towards employment-intensive economic growth. Industrial transition in this context is 
broadly understood as the sum of all long-run trends of structural change in the economy that have 
significant impacts on production, consumption, as well as societal outcomes like employment and 
sustainability. At the centre of the approach to transitions adopted in the Working Group is the 
development of credible positive visions for the future that can be the source of pride and 
inspiration for the territory and a rallying point for the mobilisation of actors and resources from all 
levels. 
The core activity of the Working Group is the production of reviews of industrial transition 
following a common methodology (POINT, Projecting Opportunities for INdustrial Transition) that 
seeks to operationalise insights from the now considerable literatures on system 
innovation/transition management, industrial policy and innovation governance. The reviews focus 
on an industrial theme of growing global importance suggested by the relevant territorial 
authorities (for instance, but not confined to: climate change, renewable energy, electrification of 
                                           
1 Europe's ambitious plans for pervasive digitalisation are also documented in the White Paper on Artificial 
Intelligence (EC, 2020a) and the European Data Strategy (EC, 2020b). 
2 https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ris3-in-lagging-regions  
3 The Working Group comprises of JRC staff, the partner member state authorities, an Advisory Board and 
external experts engaged in reviews of industrial transition, coordinated by Ken Guy (WG Chair) and Prof. 
Erik Arnold (WG Rapporteur). 
4 https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/industrial-transition  
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transport, circular economy, digitalisation, artificial intelligence) to collect evidence and examine the 
scope for developing adequate territorial responses that harness cross-portfolio complementarities 
(e.g. between ministries and between levels of governance) and cross-stakeholder coordination (e.g. 
between businesses and broad constituencies of consumers/users). The current phase of the project 
includes four such reviews (Andalusia, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania). A final Synthesis Report 
documents the outcomes of the deliberations of the Working Group, including the reviews and other 
lessons from leading international practice on industrial transitions. 
The present report provides guidelines concerning concepts, rationales and methodological 
considerations aimed at experts conducting POINT reviews and at policy makers and analysts with 
an interest in the operationalisation of transformative industrial innovation. The reviews aim to 
enhance Smart Specialisation Strategies (S3), by building the evidence base for appropriate "Actions 
to Manage Industrial Transitions" (proposed as fulfilment criterion No.6 of the enabling condition of 
good governance for the 2021-27 multi-annual financing period of the EU Structural Funds5). 
Additional objectives include contributions to the eventual development of a positive vision for the 
territory (by pointing to viable paths enjoying broad stakeholder support) and contributions to the 
evolution of S3 into a framework for transformative industrial policy (by extending planning and 
coordination beyond the domain of innovation or cohesion policy to include all portfolios impinging 
on industry).  
The report consists of five parts. Following the introductory Part 1, Part 2 presents the conceptual 
framework and includes definitions and additional references to extant literature. Part 3 presents 
the multifaceted rationale for POINT reviews, which serves to explain choices with regard to 
concepts and methodology and locate the reviews as a tool that is positioned within a broader and 
longer-term policy making process. Part 4 presents guidelines for conducting the reviews, in the 
form of a series of steps to follow, with accompanying questions and considerations in answering 
them as well as a list of desirable findings for each step. Part 5 spells out some concluding remarks 
with respect to the limitations of POINT reviews and future avenues for their development. A 
suggested structure of the final report for a POINT Review is presented in an annex.  
                                           
5 The criteria for fulfilment of enabling condition for good governance of smart specialisation have been 
proposed as: 
“Smart specialisation strategy(ies) shall be supported by: 
 
1. Up-to-date analysis of bottlenecks for innovation diffusion, including digitalisation 
2. Existence of competent regional / national institution or body, responsible for the management of the smart 
specialisation strategy 
3. Monitoring and evaluation tools to measure performance towards the objectives of the strategy 
4. Effective functioning of entrepreneurial discovery process 
5. Actions necessary to improve national or regional research and innovation systems 
6. Actions to manage industrial transition 
7. Measures for international collaboration” 
 
Source: Annex IV of COM(2018) 375 final, p.19 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0375&from=EN  Document 2) 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1 System Innovation   
For a long time, our understanding of innovation has been centred on firms, in recognition of their 
pivotal role in the generation of economically useful novelty. The systems of innovation approach6 
that had come to dominate discourse by the late 1990s therefore paid much attention to innovation 
processes at the level of firms7 and of other knowledge producing organisations such as universities 
and public research organisations. Preoccupied with policy makers’ concerns about international 
competitiveness, and inspired by studies of advanced innovation systems (primarily in the United 
States and Western Europe), this framing of innovation emphasised those activities that directly 
contribute to shifting the global knowledge frontier, and saw insufficient linkages between 
knowledge producing organisations as a key policy challenge. What it left out however, turned out 
to be important.  
Recent years have seen the development of a new framing of innovation (Geels, 2002; Schot and 
Geels, 2008; Weber and Rohracher, 2012; OECD, 2015; Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). This new 
framing has come to be known as “System Innovation” (also known as “systemic innovation” or 
“system-level innovation”). It emphasises system-level innovations, which in addition to niche 
innovations by individuals and organisations require changes in the structure or “architecture” of the 
system. A few indicative examples of system innovations are outlined in Table 1 below.  
  
                                           
6 One could argue, with some justification, that the original formulations of systems of innovation literature in 
the 1980s and early 1990s [notably Dosi (1982), Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1992)] also paid attention 
to users and were as broad as the entire socio-economic system, and that it was only the R&D- and high-
tech-centred variant of systems of innovation framing, which incidentally dominated policy discourse, that 
took the partial view of the system.  
7 The present section assumes some familiarity with national (as in Lundvall, 1992; Freeman, 1995; OECD, 
1997), sectoral (as in Malerba, 2002) and regional innovation systems (as in Cooke, 2001, Asheim and 
Gertler, 2005) perspectives and with the functional perspective on innovation systems (which asserts that 
systems are defined by their functional purpose, see e.g. Hekkert et al., 2007). It also assumes familiarity 
with EU policies and funding instruments in support of territorial development and research and innovation, 
particularly the concept of Smart Specialisation Strategies (S3) (Foray et al., 2012). More information 
about these can be obtained by following up with the references cited in the text. 
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Table 1. Examples of System Innovations 
System 
innovation 
Functional purpose Constituent and/or 
complementary 
innovations 
Enabling regulation and 
infrastructure 
Contributing social 
groups (locus of agency) 
Electricity grid Electrification of 
industry and 
households 
Dynamo, power plant, 
transmission lines, electrical 
motors, lighting and 
refrigeration 
Grid infrastructure, safety 
regulation, standards and 
certification 
Large-scale utilities; 
government regulators; 
(formerly) state-owned 
firms 
Controlled-access 
highway (e.g. the 
Autobahn) 
Untethered long-
range high-speed land 
travel; Integration of 
national economy 
Assembly line, 
mechanisation of 
construction, off site 
fabrication, affordable 
automobiles 
Legislation to restrict right 
of way, Spatial/urban 
planning regulations, 
Vienna Convention, 
Transport infrastructure, 
Petrochemical logistics. 
Government (public 
infrastructure), industrial 
nexus of mining, 
manufacturing and 
construction, households, 
maintenance and repair 
specialists  
Global value 
chains 
Productivity 
improvements, 
integration of global 
economy 
Interchangeable parts, 
shipping container, tank ship, 
just-in-time manufacturing 
International trade 
agreements and 
enforcement frameworks 
(e.g. World Trade 
Organisation) 
Businesses working across 
multiple legal jurisdictions; 
governments; international 
organisations 
Internet Global information 
exchange network 
Personal computers, internet 
protocol, multimedia, 
broadband networking, 
mobile phones 
Domain name registrars; 
standards development; 
digital communication and 
privacy legislation 
Computer users, software 
and content developers, 
businesses developing 
hardware and offering 
telecommunication services 
Feed-in tariffs  Create markets for 
environmentally 
sustainable energy 
Photovoltaic panels, 
stationary batteries, 
microgrids, distributed 
ledgers, electric vehicles 
Legislation to guarantee 
grid access, long-term 
contracts, step-by-step 
reductions in tariffs 
Energy hardware 
manufacturers, households, 
utilities, government 
regulators, software 
developers. 
Two-sided 
platforms (e.g. 
Yellow Pages, 
eBay, AirBnB) 
Information 
infrastructure to 
facilitate transactions 
Internet, on-line payments, 
logistics 
Business-driven standard 
setting and adoption. 
Platform owners and 
developers, sellers, buyers 
Electric vehicles 
and renewable 
energy nexus 
Sustainable energy 
and transport and via 
new modalities, 
enhanced access to 
transport services 
Electric trains, high energy 
density batteries, 
autonomous driving, feed-in 
tariffs 
Emission regulation, urban 
combustion vehicle bans, 
fiscal incentives, charging 
infrastructure 
Drivers, passengers, 
manufacturers, electric 
utilities (power, grid, 
telecommunication), urban 
planners, households 
Distributed 
manufacturing 
(3d additive and 
subtractive 
manufacturing) 
Place-based 
manufacturing for 
goods where high unit 
costs can be tolerated 
(e.g. iterative 
prototyping, 
instruments) 
Computer-aided design, 
computer numerical control 
(CNC), two-sided design 
platforms, material 
extrusion, milling, material 
innovations 
Intellectual property right 
attribution and 
enforcement, environment 
and health and safety 
regulations  
Model designers, platform 
owners, software 
developers, users, CNC mill 
manufacturers, printer 
manufacturers, material 
manufacturers, machinists, 
repairers 
Source: Own elaboration 
While recognising the importance of firms and other knowledge producing organisations, this new 
framing is much broader. It encompasses the entirety of the production and consumption system, 
with its complex functional relationships (see Figure 1). In this framing, innovations are not just at 
the level of the firm or at the level of scientific and technological niches by other knowledge 
organisations but can also include fundamental changes in the relationships or the “architecture” of 
the system. Moreover, this new framing is motivated by a recognition that truly transformative 
 
11 
social change is rarely just about the underlying science and technology: it invariably involves new 
socio-economic configurations meant to serve new socio-economic functions. 
Insofar as the economy is concerned, in this new framing firms and knowledge producers share the 
centre stage with households and users. The role of government in this framing is also broader, as 
the provider of essential physical and social infrastructures that enable system-level innovations to 
happen. Some even argue that governments, as well as businesses, can be benevolent designers of 
system-level innovations (Grin, 2008; Mazzucato, 2016). System-level innovations however can 
have no single designer: insofar as their reach is truly systemic, they are invariably co-developed 
and represent the sum of countless contributions – even if some actors play a disproportionately 
influential role. Distributed agency, loosely connected by fleetingly aligned interests, is a key feature 
of system innovations. 
Figure 1. Social groups in a stylised production and consumption system 
 
Source: Geels (2004: p.901) 
System Innovation needs to be understood not only as a broader, but in fact a multi-level and 
dynamic process (Schot and Geels, 2008). A dynamic multi-level perspective that usefully 
summarises the complex processes that also characterise industrial transitions is presented in 
Figure 2. The System Innovation framework, strongly shaped by the work of Geels (2002), explicitly 
accounts for global impulses (or exogenous “landscape” developments), systemic innovations (or 
“socio-technical regimes”), as well as (individual, organisational or territorial) niches and, in addition 
to key stakeholders in the knowledge system, incorporates a swathe of additional actors relevant to 
industrial policy. It allows for the economic, social, political and individual pressures and constraints 
– including passive and active resistance- that shape the configurations of socio-technical systems. 
Consumers and technology users play an important role. It is summarily explained in OECD (2015: 
pp. 14-15) as follows: “In its simplest form the concept comprises of two core elements: 
 An impulse for change in the form of the global emergence of a radical innovation (e.g. a major scientific 
discovery, a game-changing invention, a new way of organising production), a major socio-political or 
economic development (e.g. membership to a free trade area, a financial crisis, a war) or a great social 
challenge (e.g. climate change, energy, demographic shifts). Alternatively, the impulse may emerge from 
within (and be perhaps specific to) the system, reflecting context-specific innovations or radical shifts in 
tastes and preferences. Though the balance of probability is that the impulse originates outside the 
system, it nevertheless implies extensive technical, economic, social and political change (not necessarily 
in this order) within the system. 
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 The system’s response to the impulse, in the form of new production and consumption arrangements, 
new skills, new infrastructure, subsequent innovations (many of them specific to the system’s context), 
new social arrangements (e.g. professional associations), new rules and new forms of governance, to 
name but a few. The response’s duration and precise outcome depend on the system’s capacity to 
transform, itself a complex function of, among others, the system’s structure and prevalent institutions.” 
 
Figure 2. Multi-level perspective on transitions. 
 
Source: Schot and Geels (2008: p. 546) 
The framing of System Innovation does not mean that the extensive body of evidence accumulated 
from the study of innovation over the past three decades is no longer relevant (Fagerberg, 2018). 
On the contrary, it means that experience with innovation and its governance in national, regional 
and sectoral systems is more relevant than ever, and that its lessons must now be heeded by a 
broader set of policy makers than those traditionally tasked with science, technology and innovation 
policy.  At the same time, directionality – and more specifically the long-overdue recognition that 
innovation can be both “good” and “bad” for the economy, society, and the environment – means 
that innovation governance must be enriched from the experience of other policy domains with long 
traditions of regulating negative externalities8, so that government can additionally act as a 
“warner”, “mitigator”, “gatekeeper” or “watchdog” (Borrás and Edler, 2020, see Box 1).   
 
Box 1. Roles of the state in System Innovation 
Observer: the state monitors the course of events, following up the developments and trends in the socio-
technical system. 
Warner: the state identifies potential risks to users, citizens and institutions; develops and communicates a 
warning narrative around those risks. 
                                           
8 Examples include competition/antitrust policy, environmental policy and regulation and consumer protection.  
 
13 
Mitigator: the state tries actively to reduce the negative effects that arises as a consequence of socio-
technical change. 
Opportunist: the state takes up the opportunity arising from socio-technical change, becoming itself an 
active beneficiary of the new social technical system for specific purposes. 
Facilitator: the state actively seeks to make a process easier by supporting specific dynamics of other 
agents’ change initiatives. 
Lead-user: the state initiates market creation by acting as lead user and co-designer in order to find specific 
solutions to public needs. 
Enabler of societal engagement: the state encourages actively the involvement of stakeholders in 
participatory processes to define direction of change. 
Gatekeeper: the state actively controls access for change agents, opening up or closing down spaces for 
experimentation and transformation. 
Promoter: the state acts as a champion, proponent and exponent of change in the sociotechnical system. 
Moderator: the state acts as an arbitrator or negotiator between different social and political positions 
among agents regarding the direction of transformation of a sociotechnical system. 
Initiator: the state identifies early on some opportunities, and pro-actively uses its own knowledge and 
resources to work in concrete ways for the transformation of the sociotechnical system. 
Guarantor: the state actively and directly secures operations against financial and/or security and safety 
risks. 
Watchdog: the state actively ensures that individual agents in a sociotechnical system comply with 
particular collectively defined norms. 
 
Source: Borrás and Edler (2020) 
 
2.2 Mobilising S3 for System Innovation 
Smart Specialisation has so far been deployed with a view to bring innovation-led territorial 
development. The governance solutions it has put in place, especially the notion of a pre-defined 
long-term strategy and the bottom-up aggregation of niche interests into policy priorities potentially 
representative of a regional consensus through the so-called “entrepreneurial discovery process” 
(EDP), can be applied to other kinds of transitions. The System Innovation approach usefully 
complements the S3 perspective by broadening the framing of the issues and explicitly accounting 
for global impulses. Moreover, what the broader framing of innovation System Innovation offers, 
can potentially enrich S3 with features of new industrial policies such as a preoccupation with 
demand (Chang and Andreoni, 2020) and with features of green industrial policies, such as 
attractive visions,  implementation roadmaps and a carefully calibrated and sequenced mix of 
policies (Kemp and Never, 2017). In the cases of industrial transitions examined here, the 
application of S3 needs to evolve and adapt by taking onboard the following considerations. 
Need for time-critical solutions: Unlike uncertainty-governed science and technology where it is 
wise for envisioned impacts to be open-ended, in an industrial transition impacts9 must specifically 
correspond to solving territorial problems and must materialise within specific time-frames10. The 
                                           
9 “[…] low-carbon transitions are goal-oriented or “purposive” in the sense of addressing the problem of climate 
change. This makes them different from historical transitions which were largely “emergent”, with 
entrepreneurs exploiting the commercial opportunities offered by new technology” (Geels et al., 2017: 
464). 
10 This does not mean that once a desirable endpoint is reached that all change must come to a halt. Seen from 
a longer-term perspective, a transition endpoint is but a milestone in the territory’s future. Transformative 
policy should nurture the processes that allow continuous adaptation and improvement, even beyond 
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endpoint of the transition will have to be more measurably concrete than most vision statements 
drafted in the context of conventional innovation strategies, as the successful management of the 
transition must satisfy objective constraints to, for instance, conserve specific levels of 
employment, restore the environment and/or improve public health. These time-dependent 
constraints also imply that a large part (perhaps the bulk) of investments required for industrial 
transition are of a different nature than those traditionally foreseen in most innovation strategies 
(see also the point below about predictability). 
Need to move beyond the territory’s existing comparative advantage: Not all territories will 
have established productive activities and capabilities that allow them to participate in emerging 
value chains or benefit from their enhanced consumption possibilities. S3 has so far emphasised a 
search process for entrepreneurial opportunities in close proximity to existing economic strengths. 
This approach emerged in response to policy concerns with effectiveness (see Box 2). and while it 
has the advantage of supporting branching along established sectoral paths (Balland et al., 2019), it 
is an insufficient means of benefitting from global impulses in economic activities and knowledge 
areas that are not developed within the territory. A direction for industrial development that is only 
informed by what a territory can produce at present may not be profitable11. In fact, the current 
resurgence of policy interest in industrial transition has been prompted by the predicament of 
regions with deeply entrenched lock-in into sectoral paths with little or no future. Such is the case of 
regions with a high degree of specialisation in coal extraction and use, where strengthening 
established sectoral paths would only serve to support economically uncompetitive and 
environmentally unsustainable industries, where the opportunities for branching and diversification 
are limited or non-existent. Therefore, alongside policy that strengthens established economic 
dynamics, where this makes sense, there is a need for policy that develops new industries and 
supports branching into economic activities of growing global demand (see also Table 2 in the 
following section) (Asheim et al, 2011; Hassink and Gong, 2019). 
 
Box 2.  Ambitious directional policy need not result in “high tech fantasies” 
 
S3 emphasis on targeting activities close to the territory’s existing comparative advantage has 
come as an antidote to unrealistic ambitions to develop innovation capabilities on what were 
historically fashionable sectors such as ICTs, biotechnology and nanotechnology. The proliferation of 
public investments in fashionable sectors, ostensibly to little or no avail, has given rise to their 
depiction as “high-tech fantasies” or “Cathedrals in the desert”.  
 
However, by definition, close adherence to comparative advantage promotes structural stability. 
Industrial transitions require heuristics that are structurally dynamic. In keeping with modern 
industrial policies (Chang and Andreoni, 2020), leveraging local consumer demand and public 
procurement for essential public services are a promising path for insertion into emerging global 
value chains linked to the transition. An appropriately sequenced policy mix based on evidence and 
which avoids vain attempts at leapfrogging can reconcile pragmatic short term interventions with a 
high level of long term ambition. The reviews can produce precisely such a policy mix, because of 
the following features of the POINT methodology:  
- Based on evidence of material conditions in the territory, notably as the result of extensive 
                                                                                                                                    
meeting the immediate transition challenges. This can be situated in a longer-term process of co-
evolutionary change (Ravetz, 2020). 
11 Supply after all does not generate its own demand - the opposite is the much-maligned Say’s Law, the 
comprehensively refutation of which is one of Keynes’ (1936) less controversial arguments. The rarity of 
radical innovations that shape demand – for example the iPhone – shows that they are the exceptions that 
prove the rule. This holds widely in markets for knowledge. Detailed empirical work by Schmookler (1966) 
examining patenting trends over the 19th and 20th centuries suggests that it is unevenness in the spread 
of demand for particular products and services, and the competitive pressures it fuels, that steers the 
sectoral distribution of R&D (including the rising cost of R&D over time in any high-demand sector).  
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consultations with businesses and other stakeholders, which would serve to ground any unrealistic 
ambitions to reality. 
- A preferential search for industrial development pathways that build on mostly existing science and 
technology, and are therefore not subject to deep uncertainty. Novelty and value in such paths 
rather comes from the combination of science, technology, organisational, marketing and 
behavioural adaptions. 
- A systemic perspective does not allow for sharp discontinuities or incongruent components. The 
transition pathways developed in a review are continuous and incremental. The emphasis on a 
sequenced policy mix means that the more ambitious investments are conditional on the correction 
of functional failures first (see in particular Table 10 in Chapter 4 for guidance).  
- Continuity implies that it is not necessary for the full extent of the vision to be realised to have a 
positive impact. Contrarily, ambitious interventions that incrementally build on one another and form 
part of a comprehensive system are not unrealistic. 
 
 
Not just about research and innovation: The policy dossier must expand beyond research and 
innovation, to include – depending on the industrial theme – support for education and skills (Box 3), 
investment, social protection, energy, environment, infrastructure, land use and urban planning, 
waste management, agriculture, health, defence among others. The stakeholders involved will vary 
accordingly - not just the four-actor grouping (government, academia, industry, civil society) that is 
typically considered in Smart Specialisation policy discussions but also trade unions, city councils, 
regulators, legislative bodies, health and environment agencies, transport boards, vocational 
education and training (VET) providers, standard-setters, consumer associations and demand-
shaping influencers, to name but a few (Weber and Rohracher, 2012; Borrás and Edler, 2020). 
 
Box 3. The role of education and training for industrial transition 
 
While successful industrial transitions may rely on a host of different policy areas, targeted provision of 
education and training is one of the most important to address. It has been largely neglected by S3, showing 
the limitation of traditional R&I policies (Edwards et al 2017; Hazelkorn and Edwards 2019). The most 
successful and innovative firms invest in different types of human competences (through recruitment or in 
house training), but they are geographically concentrated in more economically developed regions. Public 
investment has a role to increase the collective availability of human competences in those places that need 
them most.  
 
Contrarily, the reductions of public knowledge investments in higher education and research and innovation 
due to short-term pressures may be curtailing long-term EU growth and welfare potential (Archibugi and 
Filippetti, 2016). It appears of utmost importance to guarantee the provision of adequate human capital to 
fulfil the new knowledge needs. In fact, investment in human competences can allow firms to better absorb 
new technologies and adapt to new business models. However, ‘soft’ competences are needed in addition to 
technical skills for the specific transition path that is to be followed. Furthermore, vocational education, 
training and adult learning can address demographic challenges in regions going through industrial transition, 
since the population is likely to be older and requires upskilling or reskilling through innovative pedagogical 
techniques. Other factors affecting participation in education and training include gender and social exclusion. 
More generally, upskilling and reskilling increase social esteem and civic awareness, acting as a mitigating 
factor against the negative consequences of unemployment and globalisation. 
 
High cost: Industrial transitions are vastly more costly than the budgets allocated to an innovation 
strategy. The costs are likely to be orders of magnitude above what can be reasonably covered by 
local businesses or the regional government. For instance, in the case of a, more or less, managed 
coal transition in the Dutch region of Limburg during the 1970s, the bulk of the burden – 
approximately 11.6bn EUR in today’s prices for an industry concerning 75,000 jobs (Caldecott et al., 
2017) – fell on the national government, with the then European Economic Community picking up 
also part of the bill.  
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Predictability of outcomes: A key difference between a research and innovation project and a 
conventional investment project (e.g. in construction) is the predictability of their outcomes. R&D 
investments resemble an event whose probability of success is in large part unknowable (such as 
being struck by lightning) and the part that is knowable only explains a small part of the variance in 
outcomes12. By contrast, most conventional investments have a largely predictable, on the basis of 
past experience, chance of success or failure. The need for a fixed endpoint – especially 
reassurances about employment numbers – argue for a move away from uncertain investments, in 
favour of low-risk projects closer to the applied side of R&D and innovation, but also and chiefly: 
rearranging the production system, deploying and adapting proven technologies, leveraging the 
power of consumers, re-training/repurposing, re-locating public investments that are employment-
intensive or supportive of insertion in global value chains, environmental remediation and even 
worker relocation measures. On the positive side, many of these investments, especially 
deployment, should be easier for economists to cost than traditional innovation investments: insofar 
as they depend less on uncertain R&D, their investment costs and likely returns can be reduced to 
calculable risk, allowing for the application of conventional financial and insurance tools, and 
potentially the attraction of conventional investors (who shy away from uncertain R&D)13.  
 
Whole-of-government mobilisation: Industrial transitions usually require complementary public 
infrastructures (e.g. in road transport, waste management facilities, energy distribution, urban 
regeneration) and crucially, legislation, regulation and transfers of authority (OECD, 2015): These all 
ascribe a major role to government, so effective within-government coordination is a key pre-
condition for success. The multi-level nature of transitions suggests the need to engage not just 
with regional but also, especially, with national authorities. This is not merely about coordination 
between regional and national authorities, but about continuous involvement and engagement at all 
relevant levels. To align national and regional capacities, advantages and priorities stakeholders and 
policymakers at different levels need a shared understanding. At the very least this implies the need 
for something like an “entrepreneurial discovery process” for government, between various 
ministries/constituencies and levels of government (see Box 4) or other forms of whole-of-
government mobilisation. Important progress has been made in tackling the specific issue of multi-
level governance in the context of current S3 insofar as competences on thematic policies and 
funding decisions lie at different levels of territorial aggregation within one country, which can form 
a good basis14 upon which to build on.   
 
Box 4. The Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) 
The term Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (or EDP) originally referred to the identification of areas for 
investment in research and innovation (i.e. priority-areas), through an inclusive and evidence-based process 
grounded in stakeholders’ engagement. An EDP was formally required by the European Commission, in order 
for regions to identify their S3 priority areas. The stakeholders include the private, research and public sector. 
Ideally non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society should be also be involved, yet this segment 
of society was in practice rarely included. Throughout the implementation of S3 an important shift emerged. 
The EDP evolved from being only an activity carried out during the S3 design phase, into a continuous one, 
                                           
12 To continue entertaining the same example, consider that holding an iron pole on top of a hill increases the 
chances of being struck by lightning but only explains a negligibly small part of all cases. 
13 Of course, the overall predictability of the social outcomes of a managed transition are a function of its 
complexity: predictability may well be low in early (pre-deployment) stages of the transition which require 
significant realignment of extant production systems and policy portfolios. But even then it won’t be near 
the realm of deep uncertainty governing R&D and science-based solutions to specific problems. Unlike 
science-based solutions, whose probability of discovery can be unresponsive to the amount of resources 
devoted to them (e.g. consider how despite colossal R&D investments by pharmaceuticals over decades, 
much-needed new families of antibiotics have not been forthcoming), solutions to the practical problems of 
transition are usually within reach if only enough resources can be mobilised to tackle them. 
14 Examples include networks of public actors coordinating their actions such as Greece’s RIS3 network or 
Spain’s I+D+I network, in both cases containing both central government and regional actors. 
 
17 
which keeps going throughout S3 implementation. Such continuous EDP implies that stakeholders are kept 
engaged in the refinement and review of priority-areas, as well as the identification of instruments that 
would implement them. The research and business sectors are expected to be involved, in particular, in 
various activities related to calls management (i.e. commenting on pre-calls, etc.) in order to develop 
appropriate instruments.  
As we move to a new phase in S3, it is important to consolidate the good practices that have emerged in the 
past few years, broadening the EDP to reach out to new segments of society.  In turn, it seems essential to 
provide clear guidance and structure for the EDP, deploying capacity-building efforts for all actors involved. 
Furthermore, and in line with the objectives of this report, it seems important to restructure the process 
around societal challenges and their possible solutions. Entrepreneurial Discovery exercises have generated 
positive learning curves making EU regions and member states readier to embrace more complex forms of 
stakeholder engagement. For more information on the process and the experience with it, see Marinelli and 
Perianez-Forte (2017) and Guzzo and Perianez-Forte (2019). The governance and steering of industrial 
transition can build on this solid base to further future transformations, inspired by the positive experience 
with the application of Shared Agendas during the EDP in Catalonia in particular (Fernandez and Romagosa, 
2020). 
 
 
Leadership at the top: The degree of within-government coordination required for large-scale 
transitions is difficult to achieve without leadership and sustained impulse at the highest political 
level (e.g. Prime Minister's office) (OECD, 2015; Arnold et al., 2018). Arguably, the wicked problem of 
transition management is largely that of policy ownership: the range of truly implicated policy 
portfolios is so broad, that ultimately no single policy stakeholder is accountable for managing 
outcomes. Recognition of this reality, and of the magnitude of the challenge for many territories, 
implies that any bottom-up initiatives in the public sector must be matched by commitment by 
political principals at the national level15. The recent experiences of Finland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden suggest that innovation policy councils, with the prime minister in a central role, may go 
some way towards addressing ownership and facilitating accountability (Fagerberg and 
Hutschenreiter, 2020). A powerful collective vision, in the form of the European Green Deal, holds 
much potential to become a rallying point for the broad mobilisation of actors and resources.  
 
2.3 Modes of industrial change and pathways for industrial development 
The current policy discourse on transitions emphasises sustainability transitions, as well as other 
transitions driven by global impulses for change (sometimes referred to as mega-trends, as in 
OECD, 2019a). However, the term “industrial transition” can belie processes of industrial change 
that vary enormously in magnitude and scope (Table 2)16. Territories have different starting points 
and long-run industrial dynamics (Bailey et al., 2018). For this reason, they face different modes of 
industrial change, even in response to the same global impulse.  
For regions with sizeable existing industry, whether in  extractive industries or regions that were 
former manufacturing centres, the relevant modes of industrial change and accompanying policy 
challenges may resemble those encountered under scenarios of industrial modernisation (case c in 
Table 2), industrial renewal and restructuring (case d), industrial branching (case e), industrial 
upgrading (case g), or servitisation17 (case i). For the smaller subset of regions that are in the 
                                           
15 Leadership may also be sought outside of government – for example among businesses with common 
interests or among concerned citizens and NGOs with intimate knowledge of the challenges and the 
goodwill to bring about meaningful change. Such form of initiative can break deadlocks when government 
in unable to intervene, particularly in early stages in the transition. This can be an alternative path to 
initiating change by raising awareness and building a wide support network until such time as the 
government (or some other representative of collective interest) can more fully take on a leadership role 
(we owe this insight to Rene Kemp).   
16 An alternative typology applicable to the general case of S3 is offered by Grillitsch and Asheim (2018). It 
distinguishes between path upgrading (climbing global production networks/GVCs); renewal, niche 
development, path diversification (related and unrelated), and path emergence (path importation and path 
creation). 
17 Servitisation – Industries using their products to sell related services. 
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privileged position of having sizeable industries in economic activities relevant to the transition 
theme (e.g. sustainability or digitalisation), then the dominant mode of industrial change may be 
further specialisation (case f) or industrial deepening (case h). However, for lagging regions with 
poorly developed productive capacities in tradables, responding largely means reaping the 
opportunities presented by strong local consumer push towards e.g. sustainability or digitalisation 
for de novo industrial development in selected niches (cases a and b), as well as, facilitating 
branching (case e) and where pockets of industrial production already exist, industrial deepening 
(case h). Finally, de novo manufacturing may be an option for those territories that seek greater 
industrial autonomy. Greater autonomy can be driven by concern about the resilience of activities 
deemed critical (e.g. in the provision of public health or security and defence) or strategic (e.g. shale 
oil in the US over the previous decade, hydrogen in Europe and more recently batteries) or due to 
political pressure to wind down exposure to globalisation in response to its unmitigated social costs 
(re-shoring).  
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Table 2. Modes of industrial change and implications for industrial development 
 
Mode of 
industrial 
change 
 
Description 
 
Comparative 
advantage 
Investment, knowledge and 
skills development 
Complementary 
physical 
infrastructure and 
regulation 
a. Development 
 (de novo)  
 
extractive 
industries, 
utilities 
 
Develop new capabilities and 
productive capacities in 
agriculture, mining.  
Created Greenfield investments, joint 
ventures, foreign direct investment. 
Construction-driven, long 
depreciation assets 
 
Technical, vocational skills and on-
the-job learning 
Large public 
infrastructures 
(especially for 
network industries 
and transport) 
 
Regulation of new 
sectors 
b. Development  
(de novo)  
 
(re-) 
manufacturing 
Develop new (or newly re-
discovered) capabilities and 
productive capacities in 
manufacturing, especially in 
tradable sectors. 
Created Investments in physical capital; 
Machinery, tools and equipment-
focused. 
 
New-to-the-firm and new-to-the-
industry innovation (emphasis on 
non-R&D innovation) 
 
Technical, vocational skills and on-
the-job learning 
Transport and 
energy 
infrastructures 
supporting 
manufacturing, 
logistics and to 
facilitate production 
co-location (e.g. 
industrial zones, 
clusters) 
 
Regulation of new 
sectors 
c. Modernisation Technology-driven upgrading, 
prompting associated structural 
change, usually within existing 
paradigms 
Unaffected New-to-the-industry and new-to-
the-world innovation (emphasis on 
applied R&D) 
 
Training within firms, conforming 
to standards, lifelong learning 
Regulations to 
promote 
technologically (or 
environmentally) 
progressive 
industrial standards 
d. Renewal / 
Restructuring 
Entrepreneurial and technological 
upgrading in response to industrial 
decline, not necessarily within 
existing paradigms (incl. transition 
in response to paradigm shifts) 
Unaffected Redeploying existing skills to new 
activities, combined with re- and 
up-skilling 
 
New entrants, start-ups 
Network 
infrastructures (e.g. 
EVs charging), co-
financed by 
consumers 
 
Environmental 
remediation 
infrastructures 
e. Branching  Diversification into related 
economic activities   
Weakened Collaboration with knowledge 
producers 
Infrastructures to 
facilitate production 
co-location (e.g. 
industrial zones, 
clusters) 
 
Regulation of new 
sectors 
f. Specialisation Growth and/or concentration of 
existing economic sectors, 
accompanied by greater reliance 
on trade outside the territory (incl. 
offshoring within GVCs) 
Strengthened FDI consolidation, seeking to 
benefit from specialised 
knowledge 
 
Professional specialisation via 
Transport and 
logistics 
infrastructure 
 
(de)Regulate trade 
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 tertiary and postgraduate 
education; Intensified business 
innovation 
 
Re-skilling/support for workforce 
linked to offshored tasks/activities 
and foster opening-
up as a means to 
facilitate 
specialisation 
 
Focused attention to 
the governance of 
the innovation 
system 
g. Upgrading Upgrading position within value 
chains, shifting to higher value 
activities/tasks. 
Unaffected Investments in human capital and 
business innovation 
 
Professional specialisation via 
tertiary and postgraduate 
education  
 
Re-skilling/support for workforce 
linked to lower value 
tasks/activities 
Public research 
organisations and 
other specialised 
knowledge services 
(e.g. Competence 
centres) 
 
Regulation of new 
activities 
h. Deepening Development of related sectors 
locally by favouring local input 
sourcing and linkages  
Strengthened Common standards, vocational 
education, skills alignment 
Infrastructures to 
facilitate production 
co-location (e.g. 
industrial zones, 
clusters) 
 
Regulation of new 
sectors 
i. Servitisation Lateral shift towards services 
building on territory’s industrial 
experience (sometimes in 
response to manufacturing 
decline). 
Weakened  IT and other intangible 
investments, R&D related to 
digitalisation 
 
Re-skilling/support for workforce 
linked to industrial tasks/activities 
Two-sided platforms; 
Standardisation 
Source: Own elaboration 
Besides the more daunting task of coordinating across portfolios, a key difference between de novo 
industrial development and other modes of industrial change, is that many of the key stakeholders 
are not present in the territory and so their participation to the industrial system must be actively 
pursued. Supporting start-ups and other forms of endogenous entrepreneurship are obvious choices 
and should be part of the solution but, on their own, are unfortunately unlikely to yield results 
within pre-defined timeframes. Rather more dependable routes for finding missing industrial 
champions to trail blaze the transition path appear to be the following: 
 The encouragement and facilitation of targeted both national direct investment (NDI) and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in activities and tasks that are relevant to the transition; 
 Nurturing the conditions for the creation of domestic lead markets for goods and services relevant to 
the transition that both solve urgent local problems and can be potentially exported (see Edler, 2006; 
Georghiou, 2007); 
 Financing major public infrastructure projects that facilitate industrial deepening from pockets of 
local excellence (e.g. under some form of public-private partnership, or through the appropriate use 
of public procurement) (for the role of large infrastructure projects in the development of productive 
and innovation capabilities see Bell, 2009).  
 
 
21 
2.4 Harnessing distributed agency 
Individual decision makers from all walks of life have, to varying extents, their own ways of 
understanding and managing the transitions that affect them. Many are actively preparing for these 
transitions, but perhaps not in ways that will necessarily be beneficial for the territory. Some, 
especially when coordinated along shared-interest lines, are sizeable enough for their individual 
decisions to shape social outcomes. All have a much better knowledge of their own needs and 
capabilities than any government could possibly have.  
Individual agency, distributed over a great number and variety of actors with unequal power over 
the system, lies at the heart of the transition. A managed transition would need to harness 
individual knowledge and preferences, and mobilise distributed agency and resources. In support of 
a managed transition, the review can aim to collect evidence about desirable future directions from 
representatives of key constituencies. The objective would be to support the government (or other 
governance structures such as broad support coalitions) in its effort to aggregate individual visions 
of the future into a positive collective path that maximises opportunities and minimises costs. 
Discovering this path can be a powerful contribution of the reviews, in terms of minimising 
uncertainty and encouraging alignment.   
Vision generation and aggregation, however, cannot be an exact science. It can be best described as 
an iterative and deeply political process, the outcomes of which will depend on the quality of its 
governance, including for example the extent to which vision-aggregation is truly representative, 
remains immune to pressures by powerful incumbents and responsive over time. Therefore, the 
reviews can contribute by examining and proposing solutions to the governance of the vision, 
informed by international practice18.  
There is a strong case to be made for bold aggregate visions for the territory. While 
transformational change in society happens only infrequently, when it does happen it tends to be 
rapid. This can be the result of a “conspiracy of countless constituents” (Ball, 2004: 119), or decision 
cascades driven by expectations. At crucial junctures in time (e.g. when there is a global window of 
opportunity or a need to act quickly to avoid bleak scenarios) a cascade of expectation-driven 
decisions will either result in rapid transformation or thwart the transition19. Once a transition 
commences, whether other actors in the system will stand behind or oppose the transition weighs 
heavily over every individual's calculations. No responsible decision maker will back a transition that 
they think will fail or commit to opposing a transition that seems set to succeed, especially when 
their decision is revealed by their actions20.  
It follows that somebody must make the first move. Shaping expectations requires leadership, 
which is in particularly short supply in territories with dysfunctional institutions and low levels of 
trust. Plausibility, meaning, and purpose are central to shaping these expectations, so one line of 
action for the government is to co-develop a compelling vision and engage in adequate planning to 
back it, including by supporting the collection of the necessary evidence and co-creating policy 
                                           
18 These can for instance include successful international examples of good governance in the application of the 
concept of RIS3 (notably from those territories that have accomplished a participatory, representative and 
continuous the entrepreneurial discover process or EDP), from the introduction of missions in EU research 
and innovation policy or from the implementation of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
19 A counter-intuitive insight from the study of mass movements (Gallopin, 2019) is that collective decisions do 
not just represent the sum of individual preferences. In addition to reflecting individual preferences, the 
decision to back a transition or otherwise is partly compositional, insofar as individual decisions depend on 
the decisions of others.  
20 A somewhat provocative implication is that it is not necessary that the specific choices of technology, 
knowledge and institutional infrastructures enjoy universal acceptance at the outset; as long as the chosen 
direction is compatible with broad territorial interests and values and remains economically viable, 
acceptance is likely to come later. The counter-implication is that if the direction is not compatible with 
territorial interests and values then even if resistance is not apparent early on in the transition, it may 
emerge suddenly later on, when the transition has advanced enough to pose a more specific challenge to 
established interests, entrenched beliefs and complex social relations. 
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intelligence21. However, arguably the greater influence in expectation-shaping comes from impactful 
actions themselves such as public investment choices, consumption-steering, new laws and new 
regulations. The government can play a key, but not unique, role in this process. It is one of the few 
decision makers whose overall resource mobilisation capacity stands to make a credible 
contribution to the transition. It can legislate and regulate systems in ways that radically alter the 
cost and benefit calculations of alternative directions for the transition (e.g. consider the impact 
that the prohibition of internal combustion engine vehicles in city centres is already having in the 
promotion of electric vehicle ownership and use). Bold, well-prepared and well-executed 
government action stands to tilt the balance in favour of positive transition endpoints, especially if 
it succeeds in empowering disadvantaged groups and co-opting constituencies who might otherwise 
oppose the transition.  
Governments can also facilitate the participatory governance of the transition. Of particular interest 
are the distribution of power and the diversity of possible solutions. Transitions have a tendency to 
reproduce existing power structures (Stirling, 2009). The government therefore has a particular duty 
to ensure that stakeholder activities that are important for the transition but for which markets do 
not (yet) exist, are recognised and strengthened. While the coordination effort required by the 
government, and all responsible decision makers, at least at the early stages of the transition, 
cannot be underestimated, the price mechanism is the most powerful method of large-scale 
coordination. Long-term solutions should ascribe a central role to markets, and should encourage 
the creation of markets and of market-based tools, while allowing room for conscious coordination 
where this cannot be achieved otherwise. 
 
2.5 Policy framings condition approaches to transition management 
No policy response is independent of the dominant frame of thinking about the economy and the 
needs of industry22. Table 3 presents some stylised responses to common challenges of industrial 
transition. Table 3 also attempts to associate policy responses to different framings of a problem 
that are themselves conditioned by characteristics of the territory’s political economy (e.g. varieties 
of capitalism, the power of lobbies), cultural preferences (e.g. on the balance of personal vs 
collective responsibility), on the popularity of economic policy paradigms (e.g. Keynesian vs 
Economic Liberalism views of the economy). 
Table 3. Types of policy responses and their framings 
Policy response Framing of 
problem  
Framing 
conditioned by 
Approach / 
process 
followed 
Types of 
interventions 
(indicative) 
Limitations Historical 
outcomes 
(examples) 
Unmanaged 
transitions 
Market 
correction 
Belief in 
allocative 
superiority of 
unfettered 
markets;  
Scope of 
government 
intervention 
limited (lack legal 
N/A N/A Allocative superiority of 
unfettered markets only 
applies to conditions that are 
rare in real economies;  
Non-priced public goods will 
not be provided; No accounting 
for social cost of 
unemployment, uneven 
territorial impacts, 
Coalmine 
closures and 
ensuing 
transitions in 
the United 
States 
(Caldecott et 
al., 2017). 
                                           
21 A hopeful example in this respect is the Finnish foresight exercise known as FinnSight (Könnölä et al., 2015), 
conducted in 2015 and whose vision is now arguably being realised (we owe this suggestion to Johan 
Stierna). 
22 The opposite is also true: the needs of industry, particularly in advanced economy settings, have, for a long 
time, focused our thinking and shaped a framing of support to industry that is R&D and technology-centred 
(see e.g. Bell, 2009). 
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basis, experience) environmental costs;  
Long-term lock-in. 
Support industrial 
champions 
Economies of 
scale in 
manufacturing; 
National 
security of 
strategic 
sectors and 
“natural 
monopolies”; 
Desire for 
national 
industry not to 
be at an 
international 
disadvantage. 
 
Post-Great 
Depression 
dominance of 
Keynesian views 
of the economy; 
Bretton-Woods 
system; Neo-
corporatist 
political 
economies 
Selective support 
to industry along 
sectoral lines; 
Support to 
individual 
“champion” 
companies; 
Export-supporting 
macroeconomic 
framework; 
Infant industry 
import-
substitution 
 
State-owned 
enterprises;  
Industrial 
relations as the 
coordination 
framework; 
Support for 
professional, 
vocational and 
tertiary skills; 
Investment 
subsidies; 
National 
technology 
standards and 
regulation. 
 
Government failure to pick 
winners; Coordination failure; 
Regulatory capture of 
government and rent seeking 
by companies and trade 
unions; 
Over-crowding of global 
investments in sectors of high 
demand decrease their returns 
and may critically subtract 
from their viability;   
Long-term political 
commitment to unviable 
investments may result in high 
sunk costs; 
Difficult to address social and 
environmental externalities. 
Dominant 
industrial 
policy  
paradigm 
globally in the 
1960s and 
1970s 
Support research, 
innovation and 
entrepreneurship 
Market failure 
in the provision 
of knowledge; 
System failures 
in knowledge 
production. 
Economic 
liberalism-based 
unwillingness to 
steer direction of 
structural change; 
Post-Bretton 
Woods 
international 
system; 
Inability to 
perform broader 
industrial policy 
interventions (incl. 
support to skills) 
 
Prioritise R&D and 
innovation 
investments; 
Promote 
networking 
between 
knowledge 
producers; 
Support for 
knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship 
and start-ups. 
IPR protection 
to create 
markets for 
knowledge; 
Fiscal 
incentives for 
R&D; 
Funding for 
joint public-
private R&D 
projects;  
Funding for 
commercialisati
on of R&D 
 
Research is fundamentally 
uncertain and cannot be 
guaranteed to respond to 
time-critical problems; 
Start-ups unlikely to 
compensate for employment 
losses; 
Lack of directional change 
entrenches lock-in into dead-
end paths; 
R&I will not yield economic 
returns to territory in the 
absence of relevant production 
capabilities; 
Technological change is skill-
biased leaving large parts of 
the workforce worse off; 
Does not address costs of 
sunset regime phase-out. 
Dominant 
industrial 
policy 
paradigm 
across 
Western 
market 
economies 
since 1990s 
(Mazzucato, 
2013). 
Support exports Negative trade 
balance 
conditions 
growth and 
employment 
Small size of 
domestic market; 
Economic 
liberalism-based 
unwillingness to 
steer direction of 
structural change; 
Post-Bretton 
Woods 
international 
system; 
Inability to 
perform broader 
industrial policy 
interventions (incl. 
support to skills). 
 
Export-led 
growth; 
Attract GVC-
relevant FDI. 
Export-oriented 
investment 
subsidies/incent
ives; 
Monetary 
policy;  
Export loan 
guarantees; 
Trade missions; 
Strategic 
participation to 
GVCs; 
Preferential 
trade 
agreements. 
Information and investment 
bottlenecks are rarely the only 
binding constraints to export-
led growth; 
Trade deficits often rooted in 
directional lock in and inability 
to produce goods and services 
that are either in global 
demand and preferred by 
domestic market; 
Globally unsustainable if 
pursued beyond the goal of 
balanced international trade. 
Taiwan, Hong 
Kong (1970s) 
Ireland 
(1980s) 
Estonia and 
parts of 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
(1990s) 
(Hagenmejer 
and Mućk, 
2019) 
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Support training 
and re-skilling 
Job losses and 
employment 
crisis 
Unwillingness or 
inability to steer 
direction of 
structural change; 
Lack of 
leadership and 
turf mentality 
among policy 
domain “owners” 
assigns exclusive 
responsibility to 
ministry 
responsible for 
employment; 
Cultural 
preference for 
personal over 
collective 
responsibility for 
a territory’s 
future. 
Identify and 
correct skill 
mismatches;  
Align content of 
education with 
market needs. 
Updated 
curricula; 
Vocational 
training;  
Lifelong 
learning; 
Support for 
training within 
firms 
Group of affected citizens 
broader than those facing 
direct threats to employment; 
Individual skills do not 
guarantee the presence of a 
sustainable production system 
that can make use of them; 
Without directional policy it is 
not clear what skills will be 
needed; 
Most workers cannot be re-
skilled within realistic 
timeframes; 
In the absence of employment 
opportunities, many workers 
may opt to quit the labour 
market altogether, aggravating 
social ills. 
 
Coal transition 
experience of 
the United 
Kingdom and 
Poland 
(Caldecott et 
al., 2017). 
Transition 
management 
Production and 
consumption 
system in 
historical lock-
in; 
Directional and 
coordination 
failure.  
Pressing need to 
solve time-critical 
problems 
 
Experience with 
(or at least 
recognition of the 
need for) whole-
of-government 
coordination 
 
Readiness to 
steer direction of 
structural change 
and manage 
conflicting 
interests 
Collect missing 
evidence and 
enable broad-
stakeholder 
participation and 
coordination 
 
Develop 
production 
capabilities in 
sectors that 
combine 
territorial 
relevance with 
growing global 
demand and 
transform 
consumption and 
procurement 
systems  
 
Manage 
resistance by 
challenging, co-
opting and/or 
compensating 
incumbents 
Dynamic policy 
mix of  
interventions in 
all relevant 
policy domains 
(e.g. fiscal, 
education, 
employment & 
social security, 
investment, 
R&I, territorial 
planning, 
thematic 
ministries);  
Engage with 
businesses and 
workers to 
facilitate 
forward 
planning in 
investment 
(incl. 
innovation) and 
re-skilling;  
Engage with 
consumers and 
users and steer 
demand;  
Provide 
complementary 
physical and 
regulatory 
infrastructure. 
Required large-scale 
investments are normally 
difficult to finance; 
Incomplete information makes 
directional policy risky; 
Public administrations may 
lack capacity for extensive 
coordination and skills for 
more tailored planning and 
instrument implementation; 
Resistance to directional 
change may not be possible to 
curb; 
No guarantee that all 
implicated stakeholders will 
participate; 
Competition for investment 
and new markets in global 
sunrise regime is fierce and 
only lower ends of emerging 
value chains may be 
contestable in the short term. 
 
Energy 
transitions in 
the 
Netherlands 
(Limburg, see 
Caldecott et 
al., 2017) and 
Germany 
(North Rhine 
Westphalia, 
see Lewe, 
2018) 
 
The confluence of a number of maturing trends are now permitting a new framing of industrial 
policy, and transition management, to emerge:  
 The calls for pervasive change demanded by digitalisation and the energy and transport transitions, 
as well as challenges (and business opportunities) linked to climate change; 
 The limits of dominant approaches to industrial policy over the past two decades become more 
evident and the legitimacy of their pre-eminence is eroded (for export-led growth, see Palley, 2011; 
for research and innovation see Mazzucato, 2013; 2016); 
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 A resurgence of interest in industrial policy and active attempts to rebuild the industrial foundations 
of advanced economies (see Warwick’s [2013] work for the OECD; Andreoni, [2016], the Franco-
German Manifesto for a European industrial policy [Bundesministerium für Wirstschaft und Energie 
and Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, 2019], and the EU’s new Industrial Strategy [EC, 
2020a]). Perhaps the most powerful indication of this interest, and of the urgency that is attached to 
it, is the readiness to approve direct aid to firms in the cases of Important Projects of Common 
European Interest23 (IPCEIs), in a sharp break from tradition in the interpretation of the sacrosanct 
rules of the EU’s common market. 
 In the realm of European cohesion policy, the new governance arrangements brought about since the 
introduction of S3, by focusing EU funding on economic activities relevant for each region, have 
shattered a long-held taboo against directional industrial policy. S3 has also permitted the 
development, perhaps for the first time at this scale, of participatory governance tools enabling 
broad stakeholder coordination. The recently introduced research and innovation missions in the EU’s 
Horizon programme24 represent another break from a long tradition of directionally neutral policy. 
 The increasing popularity among innovation scholars and analysts of system innovation and 
transformative innovation perspectives and approaches (OECD, 2015; Weber and Truffer, 2017; 
Schott and Steinmueller, 2018; Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al., 2018; Asheim, 2019; Amoroso et al., 
2019), and mission-oriented policy (Mazzucato, 2016; Hekkert et al., 2020), with evident influence in 
vanguard EU policy thinking and strategic development (e.g. EEA, 2019; EC, 2020a; EC, 2020d), not 
least in the European Green Deal itself.  
 
 
2.6 Operationalising the concepts in the reviews 
POINT reviews adopt the broad framing of System Innovation and seek to operationalise it for the 
production of timely policy intelligence. By providing evidence about the drivers, opportunities and 
threats of industrial transitions, the reviews aspire to enable government at all levels to play a 
fuller and more varied role. At the same time, they take a long-term and forward-looking 
perspective, in recognition of the need to be acting in the here and now on issues that slowly but 
surely affect entire territories over long-term horizons and call for extensive coordination and mass 
mobilisation. The reviews strive to learn from and contribute lessons to the ongoing reflection on 
the operationalisation of transformative innovation (Turnheim and Nykvist, 2019; Schot et al., 
2020). 
Starting points for the reviews involve ascertaining the current direction of the system, 
understanding the reasons for the transition, and establishing – in outline – a desirable direction for 
the territory. The ambitions of the government, which are often documented in strategic documents, 
are a key input. A deeper appreciation of territorial problems, opportunities, socio-cultural values 
and of desirable directions for the transition, can also emerge through a process of dialogue with 
stakeholders, centred on consultation meetings and follow-up interviews. These help concretise 
many of the features of a desirable direction (or endpoint) for the transition that is in keeping with 
territorial values. 
At the heart of the analytical and evaluative component of the reviews is the examination of key 
functions in the production and consumption system. The functional perspective of systems analysis 
posits that socio-economic systems comprise of elements that serve a specific purpose (or 
function). The literature on the functions of innovation systems proposes various distinct functions 
such as to create new knowledge, to support the legitimacy of an innovation (and curb resistance), 
to guide the direction of the search process, to supply resources or to facilitate the formation of 
markets (Hekkert et al., 2007). It is by empirically examining the ability of systems to deliver the 
                                           
23 See for instance, the recent announcement of approval of support for an IPCEI on batteries: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6705 
24 Five R&I missions have been defined: Adaptation to climate change including societal transformation; Cancer; 
Climate-neutral and smart cities; Healthy oceans, seas, coastal and inland waters; Soil health and food. 
More information: https://ec.europa.eu/info/horizon-europe-next-research-and-innovation-framework-programme_en  
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functions necessary to achieve their objectives that we can evaluate them, and can arrive at useful 
lessons for their improvement. There is no universal set of functions to examine, as these depend 
on the system’s underlying objectives (e.g. to support economic growth, to enhance competitiveness, 
improve well-being of all citizens, protect the environment), which are contingent and can vary 
considerably, even among otherwise similar economies and societies, and over time.  
For the industrial system covered under the themes agreed with the territorial authorities, POINT 
reviews examine the following four functions (explained in Box 5):  
 Orientation and planning; 
 Human and financial resource mobilisation; 
 Production of knowledge, goods and services; 
 Consumption and use. 
 
Box 5. System functions examined in POINT Reviews 
Orientation and planning happen chiefly within government and businesses. Visionary entrepreneurs can 
play a key role as can governments. However, consumer trends can also have well-defined orientations, 
driven in part by shifting needs and tastes (e.g. driven by demographic changes), changing social attitudes, 
pervasive social concerns (e.g. with equality or fairness or with environmental sustainability) and individual 
practices (e.g. the right to repair and openness). Planning of relevance to the transition may be across a wide 
range of policy portfolios, spread over several ministries and levels of government. Science, technology and 
innovation actors can play a key role in view of their position in spearheading knowledge development and in 
steering the system towards developing regionally- and potentially-globally relevant applications. Some of 
the stakeholders on the orientation function have a (partial) responsibility for enhancing the legitimation of 
the transition, understanding and, where appropriate, managing resistance to change. 
Resource mobilisation concerns actors who have a capacity to shift or mobilise human and financial 
resources, including financial organisations (or more broadly financial markets), public funders and ministries 
with large public procurement/investment budgets, businesses, and education and skill providers, among 
others.  
Production concerns both actors active in the generation and development of knowledge and in the 
development of manufacturing or service provision capability. These will chiefly involve businesses (notably 
as they account for the lion's share of economically-useful innovation activity), but also universities, and 
vocational skills providers insofar as their activities are relevant to accumulating relevant knowledge and 
manufacturing/service provision capabilities. 
Consumption or use involves those actors that play an important role in the formation of the markets and 
pools of users that will drive demand for the transition. In early stages of the transition the actors who help 
articulate demand include public funders, early adopter communities of users (whose preferences and 
concerns may differ significantly from the majority of users). However, broader demand articulation requires 
'mainstreaming' the consumption and use of the technologies and their products; key actors include industry 
standard- (and quality-) setters, consumer associations, producers positioned on the mass-end scale of the 
market, mass media etc. 
 
By examining each function in the current system, and evaluating it with respect to its fitness for 
purpose in view of the desired direction, the review can highlight missing elements and missing 
links in the system. It can also result in an appreciation of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats of the system that can help match territorial values and aspirations with material 
conditions. The result can be an ambitious, yet pragmatic direction. Figure 3 presents a synthetic 
overview of the review process, the functions examined and projected and the guiding principles for 
policy.  
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Figure 3. Functions of systems and principles of transformative policies 
A central objective of the POINT reviews is to contribute to the development of a credible positive 
direction for the territory. A positive direction can act as a focusing device for collective inspiration, 
reflection, discussion and action that could catalyse the transition. The reviews themselves are a 
part-intelligence gathering, part-analytical, part-creative exercise that aspires to draw from wide 
stakeholder input and high quality knowledge and expertise. They are but the beginning of, and an 
input to, a process of vision co-development and action that will have to mobilise a broad group of 
stakeholders. 
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3. Rationale for POINT Reviews 
 
3.1 The need for evidence 
There is growing policy interest in industrial transitions25, usually understood as pertaining to the 
sectors and professions that are suffering employment losses and aimed at helping affected 
industry and workers make the transition. Industry and workers, however, are embedded in wider 
production and consumption systems that are also affected by and influence the transition. When a 
wider view of the production and consumption system is taken, previously unidentified 
interconnections between its constituent parts can become obvious. Importantly, these 
interconnections represent points of powerful policy leverage, especially if their identification 
enables coordinated and timely action. Literature on transitions has shown that myriads of negative 
consequences from the transition have common systemic causes, and that these are often rooted in 
the direction of the system (Smith et al., 2005; Stirling, 2009; Stroh, 2015; Schot and Steinmueller, 
2018). For example, a system characterised by a direction of low-cost manufacturing, with 
disregard for the environment and for the well-being of workers, and facilitated by the absence of 
government regulation, is unlikely to deliver dignified employment alternatives or sustainable 
growth investment. 
A key missing element in current policy discussions on possible responses to the challenge of 
transitions is an evidence-based framework for identifying interconnections between disparate 
parts of the system and policy domains; for understanding system-wide causes of long-lasting 
problems; and for pointing to more profitable future directions for the territory. Science and 
technology will of course play a central role in this future. However, science and technology alone 
are unlikely to lead to successful solutions to time-critical problems, which for many territories and 
their societies represent existential challenges. It is important therefore to recognise that a singular 
preoccupation with science and technology can also have the effect of delaying or preventing 
necessary changes in the system. There is a pressing, and so far unmet, need to also pay attention 
to complementary policy portfolios and their instruments. Likewise, linearly extrapolating from the 
territory’s current directional path, without considering the possible openings offered by the 
transition for a new direction, can lead to a narrow framing of the transition, one that comprises 
little more than actions to retrain workers and bring in new investment. A broad framing of the 
transition encompassing the totality of the production and consumption system26 can shed light on 
underappreciated interdependencies, (e.g. the evolution of potentially complementary systems in 
the territory, the preferences of consumers) and identify key opportunities for the development of 
knowledge-intensive production and innovation capabilities. The provision of appropriate evidence 
as the result of a POINT review can set the basis for coordination between the various transition 
domains, stakeholders and policy portfolios under a coherent directional logic.  
                                           
25 The European Commission DG REGIO Pilot Action “Regions in Industrial Transition” examined transition 
pressures faced by regions facing the challenge of deindustrialisation, including  Hauts-de-France (FR), 
Norra Mellansverige (North-Middle Sweden), Piemonte (Italy), Saxony (Germany), Wallonia (Belgium), 
Cantabria (Spain), Centre Val de Loire (France), East-North Finland, Grand-Est (France), Greater 
Manchester (United Kingdom), Lithuania, Slovenia.  The pilot aimed to test new approaches to transition 
and to collect evidence to underpin policy development 
(https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/factsheets/2018/pilot-action-regions-in-industrial-transition). 
The European Commission also set up the Coal Regions in Transition Platform to support EU regions where coal 
mining and power generation accounts for a substantial share of employment (estimated to affect around 
240,000 people in 41 regions and 12 countries). The Platform promotes knowledge sharing and exchanges 
of experiences between EU coal regions (https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/EU-coal-regions/coal-
regions-transition). 
26 A broad scope of the production system includes not just businesses, but also value-added activity that is 
informal and/or embedded in social activities; whereas a broadly conceived consumption system includes 
not just material consumption (in terms of value-added services, facilities) but also shared meanings. 
Examples include the ‘foundational economy’ of childcare, domestic management, the cultural economy of 
sport or music etc. For example, Manchester owes much of its global reputation and popularity to its 1980s 
contributions to globally popular music (we owe this point to Joe Ravetz). 
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3.2 What is a “review” 
A review is an independent study of a domain of policy action aiming to produce timely intelligence. 
There is a long tradition of policy reviews in support of industry and innovation (including reviews of 
topics such as investment, education, urban and territorial development) by international 
organisations. Notable examples include the peer reviews of innovation policy by the European 
Research Area and Innovation Committee (see e.g. ERAC, 2014), the Science, Technology and 
Innovation Policy Reviews (STIP Reviews) by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2011) and the OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy (see Box 6). A policy 
review typically engages recognised experts and/or policy practitioners in their respective fields to 
collect evidence, consult with stakeholders, examine evidence and produce an independent 
assessment of performance and policy recommendations. Reviews are commonly initiated upon 
request by the competent authorities and are performed in coordination with them.  
Box 6. The OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy 
OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy are conducted since 2005, but predecessors under different title and 
varying in scope and approach date back to the 1960s. OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy offer a 
comprehensive assessment of the innovation system of individual OECD member and partner countries, 
focusing on the role of government. They provide concrete recommendations on how to improve policies 
which impact on innovation performance, including R&D policies. Each review identifies good practices from 
which other countries can learn. 
OECD Reviews have the following features:  
 Systems perspective (open national innovation systems, in some large-country reviews including 
regional case studies) 
 Common framework but customisation to specific needs of the country reviewed 
 Multi-dimensional approach  (innovation; education; industry; energy; environment; investment & 
finance) 
 Drawing on in-house and external expertise (consultants and other experts) worldwide 
 Policy domains covered:  framework conditions for innovation + “dedicated STI policies” + 
interactions (“policy mix”) 
 Evidence base:  Combination of quantitative (data-based) and qualitative analysis (incl. mapping of 
the innovation system at aggregate level and of groups of innovation actors) 
 Demand-driven 
Independence in the conduct of the Review and objectivity of its findings are features that are respected and 
valued by OECD member and partner authorities. At the same time, the Reviews contain strong elements of 
dialogue with the country reviewed, including in the definition of the Terms of Reference and the focus / 
issues examined by the review, the provision of a “Background Report” by the country following an agreed-
upon structure, country visit(s) of the Review team (OECD staff and consultants) and interviews with 
stakeholders from all parts of the innovation system.  
Recent OECD experience with the Reviews, showcases areas of increasing demand for policy intelligence that 
are in keeping with a broader framing of innovation. Recent requests by countries ask for particular attention 
to topics such as:  
 Impact of digitalisation / disruptive technological change (“Next Production Revolution”, Industry 4.0 
etc.) involving large-scale transformations; 
 Grand societal challenges: Need for transformation of systems; articulation of demand for 
innovation, inclusion of new actors, new types of programmes and coordination; 
 Issues of “upgrading” / diversification of the economy (e.g. in resource-based and lagging economies; 
but also advanced economies, e.g. as result of disruptive technological change, shifts in demand 
etc.); 
 Long-term strategic orientation and governance. 
Experience with 28 OECD Reviews spanning the past 15 years, and including EU member states (most 
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recently Austria, Finland, Lithuania, second-round reviews of Norway and Sweden, and a review of science, 
technology and higher education of Portugal) suggests that the probability of success of a review tends to be 
higher in the presence of:  
 a strong  and determined (set of) partner(s) in the country reviewed 
 broad support – across the government and among innovation stakeholders 
 embeddedness – in a timely manner – of relevant political processes (e.g. as an input in the 
development of an innovation strategy; specific reform agendas / processes) 
 a productive, multi-stage process of dialogue 
 sound evidence-based assessment (“mapping”) 
 
A review presents an occasion to obtain a holistic overview of the system. Typically, therefore, 
reviews aspire to be comprehensive in their coverage of principal components and relations in a 
system, insofar as resources permit. A review would typically use more than one source of evidence 
as a basis for its findings. Desk research, original analysis of statistics, and interviews with a large 
number of stakeholders representative of the main constituencies in the system form the body of 
evidence of a typical review. The preparation of a review requires extensive synthesis, analysis and 
the independent corroboration of individual pieces of evidence. By way of synthesis, but also 
original collection of evidence under the lens of the problem at hand and extensive stakeholder 
inputs, reviews can cover gaps in our understanding, particularly about aspects that are not covered 
by either thematic studies or statistical indicators. Reviews can thus allow a more detailed 
understanding of underlying systemic processes of structural change, and help reconcile what 
superficially appear to be contradictory accounts of reality (often exemplified in policy literatures as 
“puzzles”, “riddles” or “paradoxes”). 
Moreover, reviews represent a first step in engaging with stakeholders in order to collect evidence 
from them about aspects of the system that concern them directly. The fact that a substantial body 
of evidence for the reviews is contributed by stakeholders with distinct perspectives and interests 
presents analytical challenges. An open, participatory, and representative approach is nevertheless 
crucial for the comprehensiveness of a review’s coverage and the legitimacy of its findings. 
Stakeholder engagement under the prism of the review can help forge stronger links between 
previously disparate parts of government. By mobilising high-quality expertise, reviews can 
facilitate learning, including the absorption of lessons from international experience. Perhaps above 
all, however, reviews serve to change perspectives: they can bring about a recognition of the 
systemic nature of structural change, appreciate little recognised or “hidden” interdependencies and 
encourage a broader framing of innovation and of industrial policy. 
 
3.3. What is at stake 
Policy interest in industrial transitions is typically motivated by perceived threats to existing 
industries and the employment they provide (OECD, 2019a). Many European regions currently face 
sharp changes in external conditions that are testing their capacity to respond. These include 
economic challenges stemming from a resurgent globalisation, technological challenges such as 
digitalisation and labour-substituting automation and environmental challenges, such as the 
phasing out of coal mining in response to climate change. These global impulses for change 
represent openings with uncertain outcomes. Much can be lost or gained during the ensuing 
transitions.  
A key lesson of the history of economic development is that, besides the threats, these openings 
can provide rare opportunities for lagging territories. A cursory look at the historical record since the 
industrial revolution indicates that major innovations tend to cluster in time (Landes, 1969; 1998; 
Mokyr, 1992; Nelson, 1993). For instance, the harnessing of steam power, electricity, the internal 
combustion engine and information technology each spurred on respective technological 
 
31 
“revolutions” manifesting in consequent torrents of related innovations (Perez, 2002). Importantly, 
these spikes of inventive activity have their economic reflection in the emergence of new industrial 
sectors (see Klevorick et al., 1995) and the decline of older ones that Schumpeter memorably 
described as “gales of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942). A rich literature has documented 
and variously described these as “long waves” of industrial rise and decline (Kondratieff, 1935), 
“paradigm shifts” (Kuhn, 1996) or "technoeconomic paradigm" shifts (Dosi, 1982; 1988). Similarly, 
macro-inventions (Mokyr, 1992), general-purpose technologies (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995) 
or technological “irruptions” (Perez, 2002) are all terms alluding to fundamental and pervasive 
change. 
Innovations do not just cluster in time: their subsequent take up, development and economic 
exploitation tends to concentrate in specific places too. Historically informed readings of global 
territorial development have argued that what sets leading regions apart from the rest are "the 
shaping or uptake of major waves of innovations" (Storper, 2018; p. 200; see also Pomeranz, 2000). 
Regions that successfully ride new technology waves have been hypothesised to have greater 
“shifting capacity” of resources from old uses to new (Ergas, 1987). But success in one wave is not 
a particularly good predictor of a region's ability to ride the subsequent waves of innovations; 
moreover, no inherent characteristic or single approach to regional economic development exhibits 
a superior ability to respond to overwhelming external impulses (Storper, 2018). Rather historical 
contingency, such as serendipitous proximity to the new wave's industrial structure and various 
other “accidents” such as the presence of hero-entrepreneurs or visionary high-level policy makers 
who champion the transition's cause, are some features of (uncommon) regional successes. The 
presence of broad-based, forward-looking and realistic industrial policy is another (Chang, 2002; 
Mazzucato, 2013; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). 
 
3.4 The importance of timing 
Timely preparation matters a great deal. Once global transitions reach maturity, the broad contours 
of major paths can be predictable, so much so that the predictions of financiers can fuel waves of 
technological progress (and when they are on occasion wrong, can fuel speculative bubbles) (Perez, 
2002). There are strong indications that we are presently on the precipice of a major technological 
and industrial revolution centred around the reconfiguration of the global energy system (see e.g. 
Perez, 2013). Besides tectonic shifts in energy, transport and associated systems, not least in 
response to the need to adapt to climate change and live within our planetary boundaries, there are 
a number of other global impulses that threaten dominant production models in many European 
regions and the position of European firms in global value chains. Simultaneously, the global 
impulses represent opportunities for Europe and for industrial revival in its lagging regions that are 
too significant to ignore. 
Early action on transitions is particularly important for lagging regions. Opportunities for lagging 
regions to develop industrial capabilities (and potentially catch up with the leaders) are not evenly 
distributed in time or across industrial sectors. Importantly, the fact that deep structural change is 
often accompanied by social transformation means that these transitions represent a chance not 
just to cater for the economic growth imperative but also to respond to growing social demands to 
maintain dignified, fulfilling, and well-remunerated employment, empower traditionally 
disadvantaged groups and achieve sustainability27.  
A crucial point is that opportunities to benefit from the transition are not just available to leading 
regions. Even if lagging regions do not initially partake in the global production of knowledge, goods 
and services in, say, electric transport, they will eventually partake in their consumption. In the case 
of global impulses with pervasive implications, such as the electrification of transport, the circular 
economy or responding to climate change, all territories will sooner or later be called upon to make 
                                           
27 Understood as "meeting the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs" (originally from WCED, 1987; cited in Stirling, 2009: p. 8). 
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the inevitable interventions, consumption choices and investments. Facilitating an early transition 
can have considerable benefits even on the consumer28 (or user) side: The consumption of 
technologically or environmentally progressive goods and services is its own reward. Moreover, if 
the transition happens soon enough for the region to develop a “lead market” and be among the 
first regions among its peers with similar demand preferences29, then locally developed solutions 
can become globally-exportable niches. Major techno-economic shifts provide openings in global 
value chains, and opportunities for businesses in lagging regions that would have been impossible 
to contest otherwise. A review can provide the evidence needed to highlight viable paths and justify 
collective action in directions that would have been impossible to imagine in normal circumstances.  
Timely planning is also important for managing the downsides and escaping lock-in. A study on 
policy lessons from the history of coal transitions in several countries laments the generally 
negative experiences and poses the stark question: “…how was it possible in so many cases [for the] 
region to so poorly prepare for economic life beyond mining and thus be economically incapable of 
experiencing a smooth transition” (Caldecott et al. 2017, p.11). Leadership, or the provision of a 
long-term orientation using high quality evidence and expert intelligence to break debilitating 
inaction deadlocks, is a long-atrophied, yet entirely legitimate function of democratically elected 
governments. By the time the negative consequences of the transition become widely felt it can be 
too late to explore the positive paths. As time goes by the window of opportunity progressively 
narrows, to be eventually replaced by negative outcomes that vary only with respect to their 
intensity.   
There are many indications that prevalent governance arrangements may not deliver the required 
responses in time. The comparison between the handling of the climate emergency and of the 
COVID-19 pandemic is illustrative. The dire consequences of climate change are predictable (IPCC, 
2018), yet collective action is difficult as the consequences materialise slowly and are difficult to 
perceive. By contrast, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has consequences that are immediate, 
obvious, and costly. Yet the response to the pandemic in many cases had to wait until its painful 
consequences materialised. That COVID-19 – a predictable, predicted and potentially manageable 
epidemic – was permitted, through lack of preparation, dithering and inaction to become a global 
pandemic, is a stark demonstration of the consequences of not acting on time, and of the pressing 
need to improve the responsiveness and resilience of our societies30.  
3.5 The importance of direction 
Implicit in the term “transition” is the idea of movement or change from the current state of the 
system to another one. Current knowledge about on-going industrial transitions in Europe is limited 
but the broad outline suggests substantial pressures on employment, with entire industries and 
professions under threat in the coming decade (e.g. for a sectoral dimension of transition challenges 
see OECD 2018a pp. 68-76; for professions at risk of automation see OECD, 2018b, pp. 45-53). The 
sheer variety and plurality of interfaces suggests that affected territories stand to transition to 
largely unknown endpoints, some of which are likely to be economically, socially and 
                                           
28 Economic theory is unambiguous on this point. Improvements in aggregate economic welfare can be due to 
increases in either in producer welfare or consumer welfare. The latter is lamentably often ignored or 
mistakenly belittled in innovation policy discourse, sometimes equated to automatic or low-information 
intensity “technology diffusion”, a perspective which ignores the pervasive innovation prompted by 
deployment and adaptation and the social value of associated spillovers, the presence of increasing returns 
to adoption and the creation of lead markets. The same is also true of industrial policy discourse with tends 
to overemphasise producers, even though consumers are part of the same industrial system, not least as 
workers. Economic history is also unequivocal. Improvements in living standards following the industrial 
revolution, owe as much to efficiency improvements in businesses as they do in households: rapid 
improvements in hygiene and hence human health thanks to easy to wash cotton clothing; large jumps in 
household productivity and outward expansions in the labour/leisure budget constraint thanks to indoor 
plumbing, electric lighting and washing machines are some of the better-known examples (Mokyr, 1992). 
29 e.g. as defined by characteristics such as the size tiers of their major cities, their economic specialisation or 
specific features of their geography: mountain regions, coastal/island regions, border regions etc. 
30 It is encouraging to see that some territorial responses to the global impulse of the pandemic adopt a broader 
frame of innovation (see Wilson et al., 2020) 
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environmentally undesirable. Crucially, once a transition is underway, runaway positive feedback 
dynamics can accelerate developments and shorten the window of actionable opportunity: unless 
adequate responses are developed on time, path dependency and lock-in may block some or all of 
the more desirable transition paths31. Should policy consider industrial transitions as inevitable and 
seek to react to their consequences, or should it act proactively and attempt to steer the transition? 
It is our contention that a primary, yet largely neglected, duty of public policy is to understand as 
much as possible about the direction of change, steer the transition away from negative outcomes 
and put in place the conditions for the development of positive paths. 
Understanding the current direction of the transition is a challenging analytical task; pointing at a 
positive path is even harder as multiple and often fundamentally different orientations for change 
can be envisioned for any given global impulse, depending on among other things, the territory's 
prevalent value system32; Furthermore, assuming a positive path can be pointed at, steering the 
system successfully towards it is an enormous task that should not be underestimated. However, 
just because the tasks at hand are difficult does not mean they cannot be done or should not be 
attempted. In fact, there are good reasons to believe that even partial or very limited success on 
any of the above tasks can be enormously profitable for the territory. 
Even when the negative outcomes are foreseeable, anticipatory action cannot be guaranteed. 
Pointing to an alternative, hopefully positive (or at least less negative) destination is the first step in 
engineering it. Identifying the positive side(s) of the transition can focus attention on the narrow 
sub-set of policies and instruments that can support a successful transition, which might otherwise 
be missed. A transition direction that is in accordance with prevalent values in the territory can be 
important in motivating a broad cross-section of the territory's citizens and in reducing resistance to 
change. By contrast, a transition without a direction invites frustration and fans resistance, if not 
despair. Drawing on 20th century coal mining and processing transition experiences from Czechia, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, Caldecott et al. (2017) 
paint a bleak picture for rudderless transitions. In the absence of a realistic vision for the transition 
a common pattern is for transition management to reduce to a damage limitation exercise, with 
debate consumed by distributional disputes (e.g. how to compensate region x for the decline of 
sector y) and policy tasked with repairing the inevitable social ills33 that accompany the decline of 
industry and mass lay-offs. Setting a broadly-inclusive direction for the transition is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for industry to be transformed in good time for most lay-offs to be 
avoided or, if transformation turns out not to be feasible, for dealing with the aftermath. Having an 
idea about the general direction of change in the system focuses attention on the right paths, 
policies and associated instruments. It also reduces uncertainty and encourages investment and 
coordination. The collective outcome is to improve the likelihood of success. Moreover, managing 
the downside of the transition (both extant and likely future consequences), becomes easier if there 
is a general idea about the direction of change. Therefore, a crucial function of the reviews is to 
understand the current direction of the transition and to point to a positive direction that pays 
attention to territory-specific value frameworks and material conditions. 
Pointing at a direction for systemic change naturally raises valid questions. Who sets this direction, 
what are the trade-offs and to what extent can the system be actually steered? Insofar as the 
review merely points and not sets the direction, these questions are outside the scope of the review. 
                                           
31 The dysfunctionality of the ubiquitous QWERTY keyboard (compared to more efficient alternative 
configurations such as the Dvorak keyboard) has been is an iconic example of initial path dependency and 
eventual lock in into an objectively inefficient, yet irreversible, outcome (Stirling, 2009).  
32 Readiness to envision a positive path also depends on the territory’s position along non-linear 
learning/performance curves, possibly even starting with negative outcomes (before building momentum 
and reaping synergies that lead to the positive path). 
33 Even if workers can retrain, they often find it impossible to obtain jobs of comparable remuneration and level 
of responsibility facing an attendant loss of professional pride, socio-economic status and personal identity. 
A consequence, which was particularly stark in the coal transition experiences of the United Kingdom and 
Poland was that large numbers of miners dropped out of the workforce at a young age, preferring to live on 
disability or long-term unemployment benefits to seeking new work (Caldecott et al., 2017). 
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The review produces a body of evidence intended as an input to a government-orchestrated 
discussion with broad stakeholder involvement that can seek to answer these questions later.  
 
3.6 The need to reframe policy and collect missing evidence 
The primary focus of research and innovation policymakers has tended to be on knowledge 
production activities and their interaction with policymakers operating in other policy spheres has 
been limited. This is despite the fact that both knowledge producers and the consumers of 
innovative products and services are affected by policies in these other domains. As correctly 
emphasised in recent EU flagship publications (EEA, 2019; EC, 2020b), industrial transitions cannot 
be tackled solely by knowledge producers. Given that industrial transitions underpinned by 
technological innovation have enormous implications across a multitude of social actors and policy 
domains, it is imperative that holistic policies are developed via extensive interaction between all 
relevant policy domains and policymakers34. POINT reviews can raise awareness of the need to 
reframe the domain of policy action to that of the entire production and consumption system. 
A key contribution of the reviews is a better understanding of the affected production and 
consumption systems. Evidence is currently lacking about the direction of long-term industrial 
change: systematically available evidence is, even in the best of cases, usually limited to sectoral 
output and employment statistics, attendant business support, input or output indicators of 
corresponding science and technology systems and occasionally extends to education and skills 
systems, all of which are undoubtedly important. Yet an extensive and authoritative literature on 
historical techno-economic transitions, emphasises the role of broader interplays. To mention just a 
few these include interplays between:  
 Institutions, markets and technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982; 1988); 
 The financial sector and business investment (Perez, 2002); 
 Public policies and investments on large physical infrastructures and the development of vanguard 
production and innovation capabilities (Bell, 2009; Chang and Andreoni, 2020) and; 
 Identities, values and aspirations and normative understandings of directions of social “progress” 
(Geels, 2004; Stirling, 2009).  
Evidence on the incidence and potential for such system-level innovation, including changes in 
relations, governance structures, coordination regimes and in ways of mobilising resources, is 
generally unavailable. Identifying multi-causality and systemic causes is only possible with a 
system-level examination. A review can reveal opportunities for linking potentially synergetic 
production subsystems (e.g. energy and transport or ICT services with manufacturing), reframe 
challenges and broaden policy options.   
A system-level perspective can identify policymaking blind spots, or responsibility gaps between 
policy domains, onto which a review could shed timely light. A review is therefore also necessary to 
broaden the scope of policy coordination beyond just the traditional domain of science and 
technology-led innovation. A review can help appropriately position disparate interventions in time 
and policy space, so that the best possible use is made of public money aimed at the transition. For 
one, ignorance of progress with the transition in other policy domains can severely jeopardise the 
impact of interventions. An additional reason is that transition thinking advocates different kinds 
and modes of intervention even in the familiar policy territory of research and innovation. These 
include: 
 A focus on directionality, towards largely pre- and co-defined industrial development or 
transformation pathways that are in keeping with a territory’s cultural values and material conditions 
(Boon and Edler, 2018). A corollary of directionality is greater attention to interventions and 
                                           
34 A set of critical issues related to evidence-based practices which translate into innovation policy-thinking and 
policy-making relate to the limitations of existing theoretical/conceptual frameworks, the misuse of 
available evidence, and the extent to which the scientific community is able (with suitable data and 
methodological approaches) to respond to policy needs in a timely manner (Dosso et al., 2018). 
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investments that are merely risky (as opposed to deeply uncertain), using mostly mature 
technologies and solutions. Transition costs are often concentrated on technological adaptation and 
the deployment of associated infrastructure.  
 Governance mechanisms that facilitate coordination across government within multi-level 
governance frameworks (Arnold et al., 2018). Promising mechanisms for anchoring long-term high-
level political commitment include innovation policy councils (Fagerberg and Hutschenreiter, 2020), 
and “Mission-Oriented” approaches (Hekkert et al., 2020), while “Shared Agendas” (see Box 17) can 
nurture their attendant placed-based grassroots contributions (Fernandez and Romagosa, 2020). 
 The use of instruments that facilitate synergies with other policy domains (e.g. sandboxes for 
technological experimentation in the public provision of transport, in energy, healthcare, defence and 
during the construction of large public infrastructures) and can mobilise massive resources to 
accelerate progress along desirable pathways (public infrastructures, public procurement, public 
private partnerships, publicly-backed equity funds). Experience has shown that it is important that the 
policy mix remains dynamic and adaptable to the demands of different stages of the transition 
(Kivimaa and Kern, 2016; Geels et al., 2017). 
 A readiness by policy makers to manage tensions, including, where necessary, to challenge the 
interests of incumbents, (OECD, 2015)35. This is a major challenge for innovation policy makers, who 
are accustomed to supporting, not challenging industry. The mind-set, tools and experience required 
to do this effectively are commonly found in competition authorities.  
 New forms of evidence, new mechanisms for their collection, and new spaces for broad stakeholder 
participation36, involvement and iterative community learning (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018), yet 
also and crucially, outcome-accountability and independent evaluation (Arnold et al., 2018). The 
latter is especially important for the long-term legitimacy of systemic approaches to transition 
governance. 
 
3.7 The need for tailored support to lagging regions 
The European Commission’s 7th Cohesion Report (EC, 2017a; EC, 2017b), qualifies those European 
regions with lower than average growth and income per capita as “Lagging Regions”. There are 47 
NUTS2 regions fitting this description, for the most part in eastern (including low-income regions in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and southern Europe (including low-growth regions in 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal)37. Lagging regions face particular challenges in developing actions 
to manage industrial transitions, which relate to both characteristics of their economies and of their 
policymaking systems.  
The economies of lagging regions are characterised by the absence of scale-efficient industry [often 
reflected in low labour productivity (World Bank, 2018)], weak business innovation capabilities 
[often reflected in low business R&D intensity (Pontikakis et al., 2018)] and inability to access global 
value chains [sometimes reflected in weak tradable sectors (OECD, 2018a)]. At the same time, and 
partly as a consequence of barriers to investment and inadequate long-term planning, many of 
these regions face large physical infrastructure gaps. Collectively, these economic challenges 
                                           
35 According to OECD (2015), another important difference between system innovation and traditional 
innovation policy relates to the fact that the former is also motivated by negative externalities (in addition 
to positive externalities). This implies a stronger need to regulate industry: “Addressing negative 
externalities and imperfect competition imply a policy approach and a set of instruments which may be 
unfamiliar to STI policy makers. Critically, they involve policy interventions (such as higher taxes and 
regulation) which have the effect of increasing production costs for firms. Clashing with the interests of (at 
least some) firms and their sometimes powerful lobbies requires quite a different mind-set and capabilities 
from those usually encountered in an innovation agency.” (OECD, 2015, p. 41) 
36 Some of the social infrastructure of S3, especially the EDP and the participatory momentum it has generated 
in many territories, can serve some of these purposes and become a point of departure for the initiation of 
broadly supported shared agendas (Fernandez and Romagosa, 2020). 
37 These regions have been the focus of dedicated policy attention (EC, 2017a), and targeted support actions 
following  a European Parliament mandate for the JRC, which includes the work of the Working Group on 
Understanding and Managing Industrial Transitions. Since the second phase of the project commenced in 
2018, the territorial scope of lagging regions expanded to include Croatia. 
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aggravate social problems such as long-term unemployment and social exclusion, drive mass 
emigration and severely constrain responses to mounting environmental challenges.  
Lagging regions are also rooted within political economies with pronounced challenges for public 
administration in general, and for the design and implementation of long-term industrial policy in 
particular. These include weak rule of law, poorly staffed and sometimes dysfunctional public 
administrations, small (or non-existent) nationally- or regionally-discretionary budgets and intense 
social pressures to deal with the many visible challenges citizens face in their daily lives. These 
challenges mean that conventional policy approaches and tools are not sufficient.  
There is a pressing need to develop new production capabilities, that can contribute to sustainable 
and resilient public finances, and reverse the tide of disinvestment and emigration. The governance 
challenges confronting territories give an added impetus to the need for multi-level coordination 
and for new approaches to stakeholder involvement, that empower disadvantaged groups and set 
the basis for a just and sustainable transition. Many lagging regions do not have tradables sectors 
(OECD, 2018a, i.e. sectors with internationally traded good or services, as opposed to sectors that 
depend on regional or national demand) or realistic possibilities of developing them out of their 
existing sectors. A rich literature on the development of innovation capabilities teaches us that 
these do not develop in a productive vacuum, and are incompletely supported by a focus on R&D: 
Developing innovative capabilities goes hand in hand with developing productive capabilities (Bell, 
2009; Chang and Andreoni, 2020). 
Developing tradable sectors also requires a basis for new industrial themes and de novo industrial 
development (see modes of industrial change and implications for industrial development in Table 
2). In these cases, policy should foster both related and unrelated diversification (Asheim, 2019). 
The mostly positive experience of Galicia with the deployment of public procurement for innovation 
in fomenting new productive capabilities in the healthcare sector (Sánchez-Carreira et al., 2019; 
Uyarra et al., 2020), or the de novo development of an incipient unmanned aerial vehicle sector with 
substantial private and national investments at the initiative of the Galician regional government38 
demonstrate some of the possibilities. For the territorial possibilities to be realised however, the 
right level of ambition is necessary, and efforts have a better chance of success in a fertile national, 
European and international environment. With the launch of the European Green Deal and the 
accompanying new Industrial Strategy, backed by substantial resources, the opportunities for 
Europe’s lagging regions have never been as plentiful. The reviews can contribute evidence about 
latent territorial capabilities and their development dynamic in progressive sectors, and can inspire 
new paths of industrial development. It remains important however that attempts at unrelated 
diversification follow low-risk paths to allow the attraction of long-term investment. New industrial 
themes to the territory do not have to be high-technology-driven (see Box 7). This should facilitate 
the mobilisation of adequate resources from private and institutional investors too (e.g. the 
European Investment Bank is interested in projects with a particular risk profile).  
  
Box 7. Low-tech paths of industrial development  
Low-tech paths of industrial development may also correspond to growing consumer demand and 
opportunities for the development of vibrant tradables sectors. Examples of such paths include local 
and seasonal food (to be promoted and used by local restaurants, caterers and consumers, which 
can include new products such as wine as a new regional product thanks to climate change and 
wine farmers educated in the Bourgogne), nature-inclusive farming with active involvement of 
consumers (as prosumers and co-owners of the land, an example of this is the "Herenboeren Land 
van Weert" initiative in the Netherlands), industrial heritage tourism (an example of this is 
                                           
38 See El Pais (2015) and Novadays “The Civil UAVs Initiative is the largest innovative public procurement 
operation to date in Spain. Its design was recognised with the National Prize of Innovation 2016, by the 
Government of Spain” (http://novadays.eu/en/civil-uavs-initiative-compra-publica-innovadora/) 
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"Zollverein in the Ruhrgebiet" in the Netherlands), circular construction (for which there is a 
transition agenda in the Netherlands39), radical energy renovation of houses, and paludiculture (the 
productive use of wet and rewetted peatlands).  
Paludiculture in particular, in addition to the economic opportunities, holds much promise in the 
fight against climate change. To give an indication, in Germany alone drained peatlands account for 
only 7% of the agricultural land but are responsible for 37% of the agricultural greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (GMC, 2018); rewetting peat soils appears to be a cost efficient GHG mitigation 
measure especially when the rewetting is connected with the production of paludicrops40. 
The mentioned paths do not require a great deal of money and concern sectors sheltered from 
international competition which means they are low-risk strategies. They do not compete with 
higher-risk strategies, which means that they can be pursued in parallel. 
 
                                           
39 https://hollandcircularhotspot.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Circular-Construction-Economy.pdf  
40 https://www.b-ware.eu/sites/default/files/publicaties/LBF-69-01-2_PP_Geurts_et_al_121220.pdf  
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4. Methodological considerations: A step-by-step guide for POINT Reviews 
4.1 An outline of the review process  
The methodological considerations outlined in this section are intended to help guide experts 
performing the reviews. They are meant as suggestions intended to foster coherence across 
reviews. Due to their stepwise and incremental nature they are not meant to be read in a single 
sitting, except in outline. Rather they are offered as a guide to turn to repeatedly for advice at 
different stages in the development of a review. Additional information is provided in boxes. This 
section draws heavily in terms of system innovation concepts from Geels (2002) and OECD (2015), 
in terms of system mapping methodology from Bergek et al. (2008), in terms of system 
transformation from Stroh (2015) and in terms of S3 concepts and governance tools from Foray et 
al. (2012). Box 8 provides an overview of the process of a POINT review, including protocols for 
engaging with the experts and the partner authorities. 
Box 8. Overview of the process for a POINT Territorial Review 
 The partner territorial authorities suggest an industrial theme and agree its initial demarcation with the 
JRC. This is later refined and adjusted by the experts, with the agreement of the partner authorities. In 
considering a suitable theme, the authorities are asked to consider: 
- Is there a specific/unique window of opportunity (e.g. due to global and/or local developments) that 
justifies focusing attention on a particular theme? 
- Does the theme(s) or sector(s) present clear opportunities for employment growth (or would benefit 
from pervasive restructuring) in the foreseeable future? 
- Is the theme related to one or several existing sectors that face severe employment pressures at 
present or are likely to do so in the future? 
- Can the theme support potential synergies between the growing and declining sectors (e.g. overlap 
on skill profiles, potential reusability of physical infrastructure)? 
- Is the theme of strategic importance for the territory, in terms of capacity to strengthen 
regional/national research and innovation capacities or enter global value chains? 
 The partner authorities assign a local team to assist the smooth implementation of the review, provide 
information needed by the experts, assist with the organisation of interviews and stakeholder 
consultation meetings, comment on drafts of the report, extract and disseminate lessons from the 
review within the wider government.   
 The findings of the review are documented in a report that follows the POINT methodology, with 
appropriate adaptations agreed with the JRC.  
 The JRC engages with at least two appropriately qualified external experts. The report is the joint work of 
a national expert with intimate knowledge of the territory and the theme(s) of the review and an 
international expert with experience in industrial policy, under the close supervision of and subject to 
review by the JRC and in consultation with/reporting to the UMIT Working Group.  
 Two group interviews/stakeholder consultations take place in the territory, conducted by a JRC panel, 
comprising the national and the international experts, the JRC and potentially other members of the 
UMIT Working Group.  
 Preliminary findings of the review and drafts of the full chapters of the report are shared with the 
partner authorities and all other members of the Working Group members for feedback and discussed in 
the meetings. The final report is revised to address feedback from these discussions, prior to its 
publication. 
 
The evidence base of the reviews is a combination of literature, desk-research, consultations, and 
interviews with a broad range of stakeholders. As stakeholders can have conflicting interests and 
views, it is important for all evidence submitted to the experts in the course of interviews by 
stakeholders to be independently corroborated against published studies, statistics etc. or 
crosschecked with other appropriately qualified experts. Assessments should generally be based on 
multiple and converging sources of evidence, not solely on inputs by stakeholders. 
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The final report should contain only findings from each step presented under the common structure 
(see the Annex of the present report) and should not exceed 50 pages (any methodological notes 
should be contained in a separate annex). This section aims to provide common methodological 
guidelines and thus a measure of consistency in the collection of evidence, its analysis and 
presentation across different reviews. However, in view of the need for the guidelines to apply 
across a range of very different industrial themes and their varying objectives, some of the 
guidelines provided are necessarily broad. It is up to the experts performing the reviews to take 
appropriate decisions in keeping with the aims and objectives of the reviews, within the constraints 
of available resources.  
4.2 Step 1. Defining the theme 
The key purpose of this step is to clearly articulate, as far as possible, the industrial theme of 
interest and the degree of ambition (including by reflecting, or if agreed with the authorities, even 
proposing a headline target) before the review begins. The narrowed down boundaries and the 
review’s proposal for a headline target should reflect the priorities of regional/national authorities. 
A starting point for the review will be a headline industrial theme corresponding to a global impulse 
for change as agreed with the relevant authorities. Your first task will then be to define and 
delineate, as clearly and concretely as possible, the boundaries of the system to be reviewed in the 
territory, insofar as possible at the outset (it will be refined as the review progresses).  If it is 
documented in strategic documents (or if there is also agreement with the relevant authorities you 
may also propose) you should document at this stage a headline/summary indicator of the 
transition (e.g. for renewables to say meet 50% of final energy demand in the region by 2030; or 
say 25% of adoption for a new technology; or say 15% of regional/national employment in 
occupations linked to the transition theme.). Some transition themes (e.g. those focusing on social 
outcomes) may not be as receptive to summative measurement and target-setting. In these cases, 
it is still be important to articulate the degree of ambition by other means (e.g. “a mission 
statement” to be refined and improved by broader stakeholder engagement). 
Questions to be answered (if not already sufficiently clear): 
a. What is the geographic level of aggregation for this review? (city, metropolitan area, region, 
nation, some combination thereof)? 
If not already clear enough, check and agree the most appropriate level of aggregation with the JRC 
(and where appropriate national and regional authorities). As emphasised by literature on 
transitions, a multi-level perspective is always necessary. However, the core of the analysis (and the 
bulk of ensuing policy guidance and recommendations) should take place on a single territorial 
level. 
b. What are the reasons for the transition? Does it correspond to a window of opportunity in view of 
global impulses or, contrarily, to the need to act quickly to avoid bleak scenarios? How do these 
reasons translate into concrete opportunities or threats for the region in question? How do they 
relate to current strategic positioning?  
Articulate the chief reasons for the transition and understand how they translate into specific 
motivations for the region and its affected constituencies (workers/consumers, businesses, 
government etc.). It will be important to relate the transition's theme to stated strategic objectives, 
such as e.g. to maintain or increase employment, technological upgrading, or environmental 
sustainability, etc. You can use Table 4 to identify and analyse the reasons for transition in the 
territory related to a global impulse that could reveal either a window of opportunity or an urgent 
need to act quickly to avoid bleak scenarios. 
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Table 4. Building the case for the transition 
Global trends and external context: 
new international or EU regulations, 
social changes, emergent trends, 
new technological solutions… 
Challenges related to the territory’s context (specific resources, 
regulation, capabilities, assets and attitudes) 
Opportunities (in terms of 
employment, technological 
upgrading, environmental 
sustainability…in relation with 
territory’s strategic objectives 
Threats, problems or limitations 
(employment, education, 
infrastructures, regulation, 
specialisation, social trends…) 
   
   
   
 
A common understanding of rationales for the transition is important for the legitimacy of its 
management. It is also a key element in managing resistance (OECD, 2015) and avoiding the 
potential for conflict. This is important, as conflict, in the form of industrial action, civil strife and 
other forms of active resistance, has been a common feature of historical experiences with energy 
transitions away from coal in countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Poland and Czechia 
(Caldecott et al., 2017). In fact, among historical coal transitions examined by Caldecott et al. 
(2017) an element of active resistance was only absent in the case of the Netherlands (Limburg), 
which is at least partly due to efforts to manage the transition and achieve a common 
understanding between businesses, government and trade unions early on in the process.  
A widely-backed rationale for the transition can be elusive in some cases, as industrial transitions 
can have multiple and sometimes competing rationales. In these cases it would be important for 
the report to acknowledge the tensions and endeavour to develop (over the course of the review or 
by proposing governance solutions to be implemented beyond the review) pathways that co-opt 
competing perspectives and interests. Indeed an overall outcome of the review (which cannot of 
course be developed solely in this step) can be the identification of one or more directionalities that 
either reconcile contrasting perspectives, or allow their parallel development41. 
Special mention should be made to threats to employment in the territory. At least a couple of 
paragraphs should be devoted to this topic, identifying the economic sectors that suffered the 
greatest employment losses and gains in the recent past, and highlighting any policy intelligence 
about likely future trends (if available.) 
The final report text on the rationales should be in the form of a narrative advocating the case for 
steering the transition. For this to be convincing it is not enough merely to list the threats and 
opportunities. Some suggestions and considerations include:  
 Use statistics or other forms of evidence to back claims and always give an order of magnitude for 
the threat or opportunity (e.g. how large is the sector under threat? What EU funds avail support for 
digitalisation? How large are likely to be IPCEI42s in batteries or hydrogen?)? 
 Try to relate the threat or opportunity to a stakeholder constituency. What is at stake for each of 
them? 
                                           
41 We owe the points in this paragraph to topical suggestions by Ian Hughes and Johan Schot. 
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 Rank threats and opportunities. Not all of them have the same importance. Avoid mentioning threats 
of minor importance in the same context as much more significant ones. 
 Make the case for a coordinated response to the challenge (e.g. how coordinated and how successful 
have been past attempts to deal with some of the territory’s challenges? This will invariably require 
the need for mediating, reconciling and coordinating contrasting perspectives. 
The likely cost of the transition is likely to be orders of magnitude greater than each individual 
policy portfolio's budget, so your argument should mention specific opportunities presented by 
whole-of-government mobilisation (synergies with physical infrastructures), for leveraging 
additional private and public investment (e.g. EIB, IPCEI), and for leveraging consumer markets (e.g. 
in industrial themes such as the circular economy, sustainable agriculture, energy and transport 
where final demand is at least in part within the territory). 
c. What is the thematic focus of the review and what should be left out? What is the range of 
applications to be considered? 
This should begin with the headline industrial theme as agreed with the JRC and the relevant 
authorities. This should then be further defined and narrowed down at a level of taxonomical 
granularity that would later (Step 2) allow meaningful mapping of the system in the territory. The 
demarcation of the industrial theme should be summarised in at least one (or more) tables, similar 
to Table 5 below. In considering what to study and what not to study, determine the reasons why 
this industrial theme is worthy of study. Consider whether the focus should be a knowledge field or 
a technological product/artefact (e.g. batteries, solar panels, electric vehicles), an industrial sector 
(incl. supply chain relations) or some combination thereof that responds to the given global 
impulse/grand challenge (e.g. climate change, digitalisation, circular economy, demographic change). 
Remember that both production and consumption (intermediate and final use) are important. 
Remember that the analysis does not require that the focus exists in reality as a functional system. 
Consider what other applications exist under the theme (or potential spillovers of its development in 
proximate themes/sectors) and whether it makes sense to cover them too.  
Implicit in the definition of theme is the identification of key stakeholder constituencies, in a highly 
aggregated fashion. Stakeholder theory is commonly used in foresight studies to identify those 
stakeholders most relevant to the industrial theme. Stakeholder theory posits that the key attributes 
of stakeholders are power (including “dormant” but potentially powerful stakeholders), legitimacy 
(i.e. those with a well-accepted stake) and urgency (i.e. those who stand to gain or lose immediately 
or whose stakes are otherwise time-critical)43 (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Table 5. Example "snapshot*" of thematic definition (what is in the system) 
*(It is a snapshot of what appears to be in the system at the time) 
Scientific fields Technologies Products / 
Artefacts and/or 
Services 
Businesses and 
other Non-state 
Actors 
(producers, 
industry 
associations, trade 
unions, consumer 
associations, 
citizens) 
State Actors 
(ministries, 
agencies, regions, 
cities or public 
organisations 
offering non-
traded services) 
[Scientific fields 
using some 
established 
classification 
system that would 
[e.g. Patent classes 
to be used later on 
to query PATSTAT 
(or similar) to 
identify 
[Use plain 
language, as many 
are novel; if 
possible mention 
classification 
[e.g. 
NACE codes of 
top-10 firms and 
2-3 major supply 
chain actors for 
[Lists of policy 
portfolios covered 
or indicative actual 
actors.]  
                                           
43 We owe this insight to Effie Amanatidou. 
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later on permit 
mapping areas of 
strength using 
bibliometrics] 
areas/actors] under CPA 
taxonomy44]  
 
e.g. Batteries, 
Inverters, Solar 
Panels, Wind 
generators, Smart 
Grid Systems, 
(100+ kW), EV 
Charging… 
Stations, …. 
each one; 
Business 
associations; 
Groups of workers 
and relevant trade 
unions; 
 
NGOs active in the 
transition theme]  
E.g.  
Policy portfolios of 
energy, urban 
planning, large 
infrastructures  
/ or / 
Ministry of 
Infrastructure and 
Public Works; 
Ministry of Energy, 
Ministry of 
Industry and 
Innovation, 
Ministry of 
Education and 
Skills 
European 
Commission 
(relevant DGs) 
European 
Investment Bank 
World Bank 
  Battery recycling, 
servicing of 
electric cars, 
residential energy 
generation/ 
management 
systems 
Association for 
Renewably 
Energy, … , … 
University of X, 
Department of Y, 
Public Research 
Institute, Division 
of Z, … 
… … … Financial sector 
[banks, pension 
funds, 
infrastructure 
funds) … 
… 
…. … … … … 
 
As many problems are interrelated, an ideal delineation of the transition theme would include 
proximate or (potentially) related production and technology systems and aspire to solve multiple 
social problems at once. For instance, a focus on the nexus of renewable energy, electric mobility 
and digitalisation (smart grids, smart public transport) would clearly be an appropriate response to 
the challenge of climate change. Furthermore, by massively stimulating demand, channelling 
knowledge investments and supporting the growth of tradables it may also potentially address 
simultaneously the territorial challenges of structural unemployment and economic stagnation, 
overcoming the limitations of dysfunctional institutions stunting finance, investment and growth. If 
necessary, the narrowed down thematic focus of the review could be defined in a concise/easy to 
                                           
44 See " Statistical Classification of Products by Activity in the European Union, Version 2.1":  
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL&StrNom=CPA_2_1&StrLanguageCode=EN&
IntPcKey=&StrLayoutCode=  
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abbreviate title. For additional clarity, you could also mention examples of the kinds of elements of 
the system that are left outside the system to be examined. This is to be refined at a later stage. 
d. What seems to be the appropriate degree of ambition, in view of the current degree of 
legitimation it appears to enjoy (as perhaps reflected in S3 and other strategic/industrial policy 
documents) and what is the timeframe for the transition (are there any hard deadlines, e.g. in view 
of national commitments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions or to achieve a particular level of 
public service provision digitally?)?  Has the ambition been summarised in one (or few) simple 
headline target(s) ( e.g. as share of employment, share of final energy demand , share of investment 
etc.) or can it be? 
The JRC may provide you with some preliminary information on this (on ambition levels agreed with 
the relevant authorities, particularly the existence or their proposals for any headline targets and 
the relevant timeframes, or proposals that might exist for these) as agreed with the relevant 
authorities. The starting point for this should be published strategic documents (e.g. the S3 strategy, 
a territorial or national industrial strategy, a thematic/sectoral strategy etc.) that spell out the 
territory’s ambitions. You will need to study policy literature and/or liaise with the regional/national 
contact points, if necessary in more than one policy portfolio/ministry, to identify the relevant 
documents and gain a degree of understanding of their current ambitions and whether (how) they 
have been (can be adequately) summarised in an existing or potential headline target. It is 
important to clarify that a quantitative target is not an end in its own right but rather a measurable 
indication of the current degree of ambition that the territory's authorities have on this industrial 
theme – allowing us to delimit the extent of the needed transformation. The degree of ambition 
may have been alternatively expressed in words (rather than a quantifiable target), for instance in a 
future vision that provides overall direction and a sense of magnitude (e.g. "by 2030 renewably 
energy will account for the lion's share of employment in our region… " or "…our territory aspires to 
be among the top 5 in Europe providing internationally tradable goods and services in"  or "…our 
investment plan is designed to support the transformation of our industry so that by 2040 the 
majority of manufacturing jobs pay salaries that are above the EU income per capita"). If there are 
no indications of the degree of ambition in policy documents, then you should, with the help of 
contact points in the relevant authorities and the JRC, attempt to articulate the degree of ambition 
you believe could enjoy broad legitimacy at present. Again, it should be emphasised that the 
purpose of documenting the degree of ambition here is not for the review to set targets or to 
articulate a vision (this is of course up to the territory) but to focus our thinking in latter steps about 
what needs to change for that degree of ambition to be realised. This is to be revised, as 
appropriate, when new information comes to your attention and/or in view of political developments 
in the territory (e.g. a new strategy). 
e. Does the narrowed-down selection (including what is in/out) and the ambition/timeline reflect the 
priorities of the relevant authorities (e.g. those embodied in S3 but not exclusively, as S3 may have 
missed them in view of its focus on existing strengths)? 
Liaise with the regional/national contact points and share with them your definition of the system's 
outer boundaries (even if this may change later on). Ensure they get a chance to comment on it and 
that it does not contradict their priorities. 
Outcomes/findings of this step: 
 A fully-developed rationale for the transition, based in part on Table 4. (2-3 pages) 
 A specific list/table of technologies, knowledge domains, industrial sectors, products/services that are 
explicitly included (and excluded) in the thematic focus (1-2 pages). 
 A proposed headline indicator and an initial timeline for its achievement (if not provided already by 
the authorities) (1 page). 
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4.3 Step 2. Mapping the current system  
The purpose of this step is to map the structural components of the system under review (actors 
[their names and coordinates, their tasks/functions and their relations]) and framework conditions 
(e.g. norms, laws, regulations, routines) under which they operate.  
The focus in this step is on mapping the system that needs to change as it currently is. Inevitably 
this means the mapping mostly concerns the disposition of the 'sunset' regime (old/established 
technologies and activities that are to be phased out) and in the positioning of the pioneering 
actors, technologies, users, support coalitions and initiatives of the 'sunrise' regime within the 
existing system. This should not be exhaustively comprehensive (as this is not possible within 
realistic time and resource constraints) but as far as possible representative of major actors and 
their aggregation into relevant constituencies. See Figure 1 for an abstract example. The actual 
mapping should mention by name at least a few key actors (where possible/meaningful) or 
constituencies (e.g. "natural gas mining companies", "citizens concerned about climate change", 
"start-ups active in the sharing economy"), drawing on, and where necessary updating the definition 
of the theme first elaborated in Step 1. The mapping should include, where appropriate, additional 
diagrams of key sub-systems (ideally complementary applications leading to positive-feedback) and 
their functional relationships. This task will be partly based on desk-based research and is to be 
complemented by telephone or face-to-face interviews. For simplicity's sake, the mapping should 
consist of the main actors (typically organisations) in the system who are analysed according to the 
function they perform in the system. These headline systemic functions (which can be further 
specified in terms of concrete tasks and roles for each actor) are: orientation and planning, resource 
mobilisation, production, consumption (see Box 5 for descriptions of each function). You should 
strive to interview at least one representative of each major constituency. Ideally, the mapping 
should be indicative and representative of the actual importance of actors/constituencies in the 
systemic functions. It is probably inevitable that we will unintentionally miss some actors, but 
comprehensiveness is not that important.  
Questions to be answered: 
a. Who are the main actors/constituencies delivering key functions in the system and what are their 
current capacities and activities in the sunset versus the sunrise regimes?  
See Figure 1 for some ideas on what groups of actors may be relevant. In identifying current areas 
of strength45 (or comparative advantages) within the territory on which to build on please consult 
policy-intelligence literature produced in support of the S3 process, including the territory's S3 
strategy itself. It would be important to focus not just on areas of current territorial strength (as 
they may be a poor match for the transition's theme) but also on the seedlings of the sunrise 
regime. If these do not really exist within the territory then mention extra-territorial actors (e.g. from 
elsewhere in the same country or from abroad) and constituencies that could strengthen the 
territorial transition, if appropriately engaged. Remember that consumer (and citizen) engagement 
with the logic of the transition theme can be a core strength for all territories, especially when it 
corresponds to inevitable future expenditures and investments (e.g. renewable energy, new energy 
vehicles, digitalisation investments).  Interviews with key stakeholders suggested by the authorities 
or experts should be used to obtain a summary mapping of the system at a high level of 
aggregation. Examples include either individual (if they are powerful enough to shape broad 
outcomes in the system) or groupings of government ministries/agencies/sub-national authorities, 
financial organisations, businesses, trade unions, universities/public research institutes, specialised 
skill providers, industry and consumer associations, unorganised user constituencies etc. Engaging 
with users and consumers can be a challenge but is important to do early on; a practical way to do 
so is to interview stakeholders with good knowledge of their needs and who can provide contact 
details of technologically-, environmentally- or socially-progressive consumers (or “prosumers” see 
Box 9). Consider that many actors will have a role both in the sunset and in the sunrise regime. 
                                           
45 This can include the availability of technologies/knowledge at the territorial level, availability of infrastructure, 
availability and absorptive capacity of users, etc. 
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Box 9. The role of prosumers in shaping demand and their contributions to the review 
Prosumers in the context of the reviews may be understood as technologically-, environmentally- or socially-
progressive consumers/users. Characteristics include (but may not characterise every prosumer):  
 
 Early adopters, with an above average interest in, and sometimes understanding of, the underlying 
science and technology of goods and (usually digital) services; as all early adopters, they are 
prepared to pay a premium for being among the first to try a technology; 
 Green prosumers, may prefer environmentally sustainable solutions and are prepared to pay a 
premium for green alternatives to traditional goods and services; some may embed the consumption 
of green products into environmentally conscious broader lifestyle choices, and may yield insights 
for complementary solutions, including behaviour changes; 
 Consumers who prefer goods and services that support weaker members of their communities (e.g. 
preferring goods and services that have been produced responsibly or by shopping locally for a 
premium); Some may also be socially-conscious citizens, eager to volunteer time and resources in 
community-driven initiatives; may have intimate knowledge of acute social needs in the territory, 
and suggestions about possible solutions, including the viability of community-owned and managed 
businesses and associated business models; 
 Technically inclined, avid readers of specialised popular press (e.g. car, technology magazines, 
"makers"), many of them with enough technical confidence to want to participate in the 
maintenance, installation, repair, re-use (or even the finding of new uses and the addition of new 
functionality that has come to be known as "hardware hacking"). Many of these prosumers form part 
of  communities advocating in favour of legislation for the "right to repair"; 
 A high propensity to participate in communities of like-minded consumers, contribute voluntarily 
knowledge and time to facilitate collective learning; 
 Some may be individual (private non-corporate) small-scale producers themselves, of digital content 
(e.g. blogs), often with no real expectation of remuneration (e.g. active contributors in social media, 
contributors to community-based hardware forums, volunteer writers for Wikipedia and similar 
platforms), in a form of participative production that has come to be known as commons-based peer 
production. 
 
Engaging with prosumers in the context of the review, and arranging to have interviews with them is 
important  because: 
 
 Many prosumers are trailblazing the use of specific product, service and organisational solutions 
that can be pivotal for specific transition paths;  
 Prosumers can provide early signals about transition trajectories, as experience from use may have 
afforded them a fuller appreciation of a solution's suitability to the territorial context; and ideas or 
suggestions about how to address its limitations; 
- Especially when appropriate solutions exhibit increasing returns to adoption (also known as "network 
effects", e.g. a telephone is only useful if other users have one) their diffusion may be too slow in 
the absence of government support (beyond just publicity); 
 Greater engagement with prosumers and interactions with producers can be a path to promote user-
inspired (user-feedback-prompted business innovation, or crowdsourcing of ideas) or user-
implemented innovation (e.g. open source hardware); 
 Prosumers may have suggestions about actual or possible (with further investment/innovation) 
solutions to specific problems; 
 The reviews can highlight, showcase and where possible, promote, prosumer behaviour. Identifying 
them can be a challenge, as they rarely interact with government. Useful first ports of call in 
identifying them include editors of popular specialised press, popular bloggers from the territory of 
other popular contributors to social media (sometimes referred to as “influencers”). 
 
b. What specific roles under each of the headline functions (orientation and planning, resource 
mobilisation, production, consumption) does each of the key actors perform in the system and how 
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do they relate and coordinate with other actors? Are they, on average, opposed to, neutral or 
supportive of a transition towards the headline themes we examine? 
Please make sure you consult the definitions of the functions provided in part A of the report (Box 
5). 
Questions posed to representative stakeholders during interviews should be designed to uncover the 
functions they deliver and document notable recent examples of activities that are emblematic of 
each stakeholder's role and tasks in their respective system. For state actors in particular, it would 
be important to obtain a comprehensive inventory of related strategies, plans, programmes, 
initiatives, policies and legislative and regulatory actions, at all levels of governance. 
c. What are the framework conditions under which the system operates?  
The answer to this question should consider the moderating influence of norms, laws, regulations, 
technological routines and practices under which the current system operates. The discussion here 
can include all non-economic and non-policy considerations (e.g. personal/cultural values, 
social/regional identities, propensity for collective action) impinging on actor behaviour and on the 
system's ability to transform.  
d. To what extent do the four functional sub-systems (orientation and planning, resource 
mobilisation, production, consumption) coincide with the geographic boundaries of the territory 
(region or region/country) under review? What are the implications for its governance? 
Insofar as the long-term goal is to foster the growth of production and/or consumption in the 
region, consider in your mapping also key actors outside the geographic boundaries of the region 
who either are or could be instrumental in achieving this goal. The answer to this question should 
also make some initial considerations about the appropriate level(s) and portfolios of governance. In 
reviews focused at the sub-national level (region, province, city), you should consider here the 
role(s) of central government within each of the four functional sub-systems. 
e. What are the current relationships (/interdependencies) between the four functional sub-systems 
(orientation and planning, resource mobilisation, production, consumption)? 
In your interviews of key stakeholders, you should ask them directly about such relationships. Are 
existing strategies the product of citizen engagement and understanding of consumer/user wants 
and needs? Is the educational system responsive to the skill demands of the emerging industry? Are 
producers aligned with and contributing to the orientation and planning function? Can producers 
access the finance needed for investment in innovation and in production capacities? In which 
direction are these relationships moving (are they static, or are they being strengthened or 
weakened). These are just some questions to ask stakeholders that could help map existing 
relationships and their dynamics. 
Outcomes/findings of this step: 
 A mapping of the system consisting of at least one (and up to 4, if you choose to do one for each 
function) diagram(s) of key (groups of) actors and their functional relationships (in the spirit of Figure 
1), accompanied by up to 4 lists or tables (or if requiring description in boxes) of up to 10 of the most 
important individual actors (such as the key actors for each of the headline functions). 
 A discussion (4-5 pages) on the scale of the system's activities and capabilities under each of the 
four headline functions, including the key relationships between actors and functions (optionally 
including one more diagram depicting the main relationships between actors across various 
functions). 
 A brief discussion (2 pages) of the framework conditions relevant to the transition. 
 Four tables with Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (one for each function), followed 
by a discussion of strategic options based on them (per function or as a whole). 
 Targeted revisions to the list / table developed as part of step 1. [list of technologies, knowledge 
domains, industrial sectors, products/services that are explicitly included (and/or excluded) in the 
thematic focus]. 
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4.4 Step 3. Visioning a desirable future system 
The purpose of this step is to envision currently missing system components and configurations 
(transition "endpoints") in order to meet the territory’s aspirations. The focus on this step is in the 
development of a direction (i.e. pointing at a “destination” of the transition), documented visually in 
an imagined mapping of the system in the form of diagrams of actors and relationships in its four 
functional sub-systems (orientation and planning, resource mobilisation, production, consumption). 
An accompanying description of each of the diagrams could (where/if possible, perhaps in reference 
to international experience or copying independent expert estimates) mention orders of magnitude 
in terms of human resources, investment, production capacities and market sizes. Explicit discussion 
should be made of possible complementary relationships between various elements in the imagined 
system. Discussion here should focus on what the system could look like, not how it could be 
transformed (this is to be done in the following step). Inasmuch as it is possible the direction should 
extrapolate from promising sunrise regime trends and should be based on future trajectories that 
the review experts believe (according to their own subjective judgement) are already well-defined 
and subject to manageable risk (and where uncertainty is largely absent46). The international 
consultant should normally take a lead role in this step, in close collaboration with the national 
consultant. In particular, drawing from experiences of global territories which are pioneers in the 
advancement of the transition's theme, the international consultant could propose new 
organisations or state actors (to cover gaps in the needed functions), new ways of linking existing 
sub-systems, engagement with leading international consortia, firms (e.g. the types of businesses to 
try and attract) and investors, put forward alternative organisational configurations or even 
alternative system "architectures", and types of grass-roots initiatives that could flourish in the 
territory if appropriately transplanted. A good starting point in developing this would be to review 
the promising developments (and emblematic territorial examples of the sunrise regime) that were 
identified in Step 2, largely, but not exclusively, as a result of interviews with stakeholders. Figure 4 
suggests how topics relevant to industrial transition could be visually presented in a way that would 
allow viable transition pathways to be identified. Box 10 outlines some considerations in your 
search for synergies between technologies, production systems, matching demand with supply, and 
policy domains.  
Box 10. Searching for Synergies 
The review does not seek to make statements on how policies for some individual policy domains (e.g. 
education and skills, investment support) can be improved. Instead, the review focuses on identifying and 
exploiting promising opportunities at the intersection of different explicitly or implicitly pursued 
developments. The key assumption here is that it is only natural for policy systems to plan policy domains 
one-by-one, while actually there might be important synergies in linking these domains together. A 
fundamental characteristic of transitions, including industrial transitions, is that they require changes 
throughout many elements of a socio-economic or production-consumption system. As transitions are held 
back by inertia in the current system, the challenge is to align system changes in such a way that they 
leverage each other. This means that, while necessarily being experimental, transitions also need coherence.  
To spur the discovery of synergies between such paths (i.e. synergies between technologies and/or the 
production systems around them), you can identify obstacles that currently hamper the exploration and 
exploitation of complementarities between different parallel developments. The findings, again structured 
according to the four production-consumption system functions, can be based on interviews probing into the 
success and fail factors for individual sectoral, social or knowledge-domain-led transition paths.  
 
                                           
46 This means extrapolating largely from the diffusion of existing innovations, rather than from imagined radical, 
science-based and therefore fundamentally uncertain discoveries. For example, on account of the 
demonstrated success of existing technologies and their rapidly declining cost curves, practically all major 
stakeholders are acting as if the mass-diffusion of electric cars is a foregone conclusion. However, the 
strong forms of AI required to enable pervasive labour-substituting automation, as well as the ethical, legal 
and regulatory issues they raise have no foregone solution. Deeply uncertain (as opposed to simply risky) 
outcomes are not responsive to the coordination effort or to the resources mobilised to bring them about. 
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Figure 4. Suggested presentation of high relevance topics for constructing industrial 
transition paths (to populate with topics that emerge in the review). 
 
Questions to be answered: 
a. Are there already elements of a vision for the territory codified in strategic documents by state 
actors or by other stakeholders? What is their current scope and degree of ambition? 
Insofar as possible, this step should build on any documents setting out the grand vision of the 
region/country (e.g. S3 priorities, flagship Industrial Policy or foresight study) that already enjoy 
either political support and/or broad legitimacy (and should in any case not contradict them). The 
inputs required for this task will come largely from existing strategic documents and from 
interviews in the territory, with possible additional interviews with experts in regions where the 
transition is considerably more advanced. This task will require interviews with at least 10 
(minimum number) of key actors.  
b. How do various stakeholder constituencies envision the territory's future? What do they see as 
"low-hanging fruit" for quick gains, and what kind of other, more radical, connections and 
reconfigurations can they imagine if there was broader support? 
The interviews should solicit information on what is going to happen anyway, what is needed in 
order to meet the headline target indicator of the transition (or otherwise pre-defined degree of 
ambition as stated by the authorities) and what could be additionally achieved if certain conditions 
were met. The visioning of the system should aspire to imagine the most ambitious configuration of 
the system that seems practically possible within the allotted timeframes. The emphasis on 
ambitious variants should not be an invitation to ignore material constraints – rather setting the bar 
high can focus attention on the paths that maximise the additionality of policy interventions and 
create multiple value for the territory (economic, social, environmental). 
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c. Are there any areas in which the underlying science and technology is uncertain and the 
technological obstacles unlikely to be lifted within predictable timeframes? 
Remember that this is a direction for what are lagging territories. Shifting the global frontier may 
occasionally happen there, but it cannot be the basis of a realistic plan for the transition. The 
interviews should try and elicit information on trajectories that are so uncertain as to be 
unresponsive to the amount of effort or coordination directed at them. We want to steer clear off 
them, in order to point to a credible direction with a fair chance of being realised. At the same time, 
the direction cannot be so unambitious so as to be uninspiring. It is important to aim for an 
appropriate balance between ambition and pragmatism. 
d. Are there any (actually or potentially) complementary themes to the ones examined as part of 
Step 2? Could some outputs of one production system become inputs for another (as in e.g. the case 
of agricultural waste and fertiliser production, or solar panels and electric vehicles)? Could such 
pathways, if sufficiently developed, lead to multiple value creation (economic, environmental, social, 
see Box 11)? 
A starting point in answering this question would be the observation of actual complementarities 
between currently disconnected systems (e.g. in other countries of regions) or a reasonable belief in 
the existence of latent complementarities.  These systems could be coupled in a number of ways. 
Examples include quasi-formal coordination mechanisms, the concerted long-term nurturing an 
investment framework and assorted opportunities in the form of public-private partnerships, novel 
financial or tax and spend instruments, re-tooling/re-skilling initiatives and the en masse 
coordination of public procurement and investment. Appropriate coupling between inter-dependent 
or complementary systems could result in circular causation47 that mutually reinforces their 
respective objectives.  
Inspiration may also be drawn by actual positive feedback loops reported by interviewees in prior 
steps. These may include positive feedback loops that strengthen complementarities between 
system functions or complementarities between policy problems/portfolios and their solutions. One 
example is the provision of user feedback, leading to responsive knowledge development and 
diffusion, in turn leading to strengthened legitimation and demand articulation. Another example 
could be the actual links between production capability and demand formation as e.g. in the case of 
batteries: as batteries find more powerful applications (electric mobility, grid load balancing), their 
diffusion increases demand for electricity. Given the right framework conditions, greater demand for 
electricity could provide a powerful incentive for private investment in renewables. Demand for 
private investment in renewables, and crucially, electric vehicles, attracts the growing attention of 
the financial sector and encourages it to offer tailored financial products and services. In a densely 
inter-connected “system of systems”, a carefully coordinated and correctly regulated transition 
towards the electrification of mobility seems an appropriate response to several inter-locked 
problems: the transition to carbon-neutral energy systems, urban air and noise pollution, city centre 
regeneration, urban sprawl, grid balancing etc. Additional ideas as to “missing” parts of the system 
could come from desktop studies of international experiences in the same industrial themes and 
subsequent reflection and analysis by the expert. 
 
                                           
47 "The hypothesis of circular causation, which tends to be a doctrine of despair for the poorer countries as long 
as they leave things to take their natural course, holds out glittering prizes for a policy of purposive 
interferences. Applied to a goal-directed national endeavour it promises results much bigger than the 
efforts implied – if the efforts succeed in starting a cumulative process upwards.[…] I stress the need that 
the plane should be founded on study, and indeed study of some of the least accessible functional 
relationships in the social system: namely the coefficient of circular causation between all the factors in the 
system. […] Real progress in national planning, gradually lifting it to the plane of advanced applied social 
science, will come when and as our knowledge is enriched about these relationships." Myrdal (1957, pp.85-
86) 
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Box 11. The Concept of Multiple Value Creation  
Multiple value creation is oriented at the creation of multiple types of value through the creation of 
new value networks (e.g. between businesses and NGOs), and through the use of design thinking 
and settlement methods for dealing with interdependent costs, benefits and risks. It invariably 
requires societal innovation (Diepenmaat et al., 2020) and boundary work in terms of exploring, 
negotiating, disrupting and realigning organisational boundaries (Velter et al., 2020). Examples of 
multiple value creation are: 
- nature-inclusive agriculture (in which farmers are involved in nature regeneration, and the 
production of healthy, environmentally sound food), 
- the involvement of social enterprises in the collection of consumer goods and the repair of those 
goods for new types of use (avoiding waste, new resources and creating employment opportunities 
for people with work impairments and a history of unemployment, 
- the use of wood as a timber frame as an alternative to cement.  
Multiple value creation is neglected by economic theory, innovation research and largely neglected 
by business because of a narrow sectoral focus, leading them to disregard benefits to be had from 
serving functional needs outside their sector. 
 
e. Can we envisage "missing" parts of the system that strongly complement the core elements of 
future sub-systems (orientation and planning, resource mobilisation, production and consumption 
sub-systems)? What would it take to "create" these missing parts? Can (some of) their functions be 
provided from outside the territory? 
Another outcome of the interviews is to identify “missing” parts of the system or the need for the 
disengagement (de-coupling) of irrelevant parts. To give an example, consider the case of 
transitions in the energy system. Transition studies have shown that transforming the energy 
system implies not just economic planning, but also a non-trivial rearrangement of its constituent 
components. The current energy system is held firmly in place by a dense mesh of inter-locked 
elements and sub-systems. Such elements can be key sources of resistance to change and include 
sub-systems consisting not just of markets and products, science and technology, or jobs and skills 
but also crucially, personal and social values and expectations, ecologies and human health, politics 
and policy, among others (OECD, 2015). It follows that changes to the energy system imply not only 
providing support for new technologies and sectors, assembling the necessary coalitions, 
withdrawing support from elements linked to the current regime and introducing elements 
supportive of the new regime, including the provision of links to other systems. 
The most obvious of these missing parts is the financial system. All historical cases of technological 
'irruptions' (Perez, 2002) depended largely on the large-scale involvement of financial markets, 
attracted by the promise of compelling investment propositions48. If suitable interview questions 
can be developed, some of these missing parts could be proposed by the interviewees who are 
directly concerned.  
Outcomes/findings of this step: 
 An imagined, highly-aggregated, mapping of the type of system (actors, tasks/functions, relations, 
framework conditions) it would take for the headline target (or other indicator of current political 
ambitions) to seem achievable. This should be presented diagrammatically in the same number of 
diagrams of each functional sub-system (up to 4) as in step 2, with the additional inclusion of a 
                                           
48 Additionally, as argued in OECD (2015, p. 69): "Some current financial arrangements, such as 
securitisation of assets and use of credit default derivatives, can be used to market securities 
based on non-fossil fuels, for example. Pension funds along with other institutional - and 
alternative - investors, such as infrastructure funds potentially have an important role to play 
in financing emerging system innovations." 
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summative diagram showing the key relationships/interdependencies between actors across sub-
systems (4-5 pages). 
 If borne out by the analysis, a revision of the boundaries of the industrial theme examined (i.e. 
further revisions to the list/table developed as part of step 1 and revised in step 2), in view of inputs 
received and a more (or less) ambitious headline target than the one you mentioned as part of step 
1 (1-2 pages). 
-  
4.5 Step 4. Identifying leverage points for the transition 
The purpose of this step is to provide guidance for actions along four axes: Governance of 
government; Building support coalitions; managing resistance to change; Defining 
policies/instruments, reforms and policy experiments.   
 
This step should provide broad directions and specific recommendations for realising the vision of 
the transition. It will necessarily have to begin with a reflection on the most appropriate points of 
leverage (point/place of intervention based on its potential to effect meaningful change), as these 
will differ considerably in each case. For some territories and industrial themes the most immediate 
point of leverage may involve raising awareness and enabling the greatest possible number of 
stakeholders to participate in the development and realisation of the vision. For others, where the 
vision already enjoys broad appeal, the leverage point may be in coordinating government and 
business action. For others still, where government has a strong mandate and a demonstrated will 
to accelerate the transition, the most responsive leverage point may be a redefinition of 
administrative hierarchies or boundaries and a massive resource alignment and reallocation. Whilst 
you should try to develop at least some appropriate recommendations for all of the four axes 
mentioned above, depending on your assessment of the most appropriate leverage point apropos 
the case in hand, and in view of the limited length of the review (50 pages) you may expand more 
on some of the axes. In practice, it will be necessary to act on multiple leverage points 
simultaneously including e.g. legislation, networking firms, skills training, raising awareness etc. 
 
Questions to be answered: 
Leverage points (drivers/obstacles to the transition) 
a. What seems to be the most fruitful way to bring about transformative change? What parts of the 
system need to be transformed and how? Are there key drivers and obstacles, in general (and if 
possible for each group of actors) in bringing about the transition? 
The obvious ones to cover here include the presence or otherwise of key actors in the regions, and 
in central government and the strength and availability of the necessary capabilities. More difficult 
ones to establish rigorously, but of potentially great importance, are features of the system's 
architecture, such as relationships, linkages or forms of coordination that either drive or serve to 
block transformation. For example, rigorously enforced property rights and/or environmental 
standards can encourage business investment in sustainable solutions, and may be a more fruitful 
direction than subsidies or tax breaks. As an inspiration to the location of unconventional points of 
leverage in the system and greater understanding of their relative importance, consider Box 12 
below. 
Box 12. Places to intervene in a system (in increasing order of effectiveness) 
Donella Meadows (1941-2001), was a prominent environmental scientist widely known for her role as 
lead author of the influential Limits to Growth, report produced in 1972 for the Club of Rome. The report used 
a computer simulation to forecast the consequences of economic and population growth against a 
background of finite resources. A revisit of the baseline forecast by Turner (2014) shows a very strong ex 
post fit to actual data over the four intervening decades. Building on her experience as a modeller of complex 
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systems, Meadows (1999) produced a list of informal suggestions to anyone concerned with their design and 
management. Despite its provisional form, the list is often cited in, among others, literature on systems 
design, environmental sustainability, software design as well as innovation studies. A shortened version is 
reproduced here with relevant adaptations, additional examples and explanations. 
12. Constants, parameters, numbers (such as subsidies, taxes, standards): In simple terms 
parameters affect the rate of flow between different parts of the system. Parameters can be important in 
the short term and can be important to the individuals (or parts of the system) that stand in the flow. 
Because of their importance to (sometimes vocal) individuals and because political systems tend to have 
short-term horizons, parameters typically command most of policy makers’ attention. However, parameters 
rarely have lasting changes in behaviour. If the system is stagnant, parameter changes rarely kickstart it and 
if it is wildly variable or spiralling out of control, parameter changes do not stabilise it. 
11. The sizes of buffers and other stabilizing stocks, relative to their flows: A buffer is a stock 
that has a stabilising influence in a system. It can help mediate between parts of the system that change at 
very different rates. Examples of stocks include shop inventories, bank savings and water reservoirs. Often 
one can stabilise a system by increasing the capacity of a buffer. But if a buffer is too big the system 
becomes inflexible. While changes in buffers can therefore have important impacts in the system’s resilience, 
buffers can also be quite hard to change. 
10. The structure of material stocks and flows and nodes of intersection: Structure in this 
context refers to the physical design of e.g. road networks, the physical location of capital and labour or the 
processing capacity of production systems which cannot change at short notice. Physical structure is crucial in 
a system, but rarely a leverage point, because changing it is not often simple. The leverage point is in proper 
design in the first place. After the structure is built, the leverage is in understanding its limitations and 
bottlenecks and refraining from fluctuations or expansions that strain its capacity. 
9. The lengths of delays, relative to the rate of system changes: Delays arise in many parts of 
systems. Examples include the time it takes for a price to adjust to a supply-demand imbalance, the delay 
between the birth of a child and the time when that child is ready to have a child. The timeliness of 
information about the state of a system and the timeliness of a planner’s reaction to this information can be 
crucial to achieving a stated objective. A system cannot respond to short-term changes when it has long 
delays. Reducing delays is not always beneficial, however. From a different perspective some delays may be 
seen as safety buffers (e.g. money transfer delays in financial markets). Despite the important effects of 
potential changes in delays, these are often not changeable (consider e.g. the construction time of 
infrastructure, the maturation time of a child, or the growth rate of a forest). It is usually easier to slow down 
growth rates in other parts of the system, so the inevitable delays will not cause as much trouble. 
8. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying to correct 
against: A negative feedback loop, is a mechanism built into a system that maintains some appointed stock 
within safe bounds. A simple example is that of a thermostat. Another example is inflation targeting. The 
ability of a negative loop to keep its appointed stock at or near its goal depends on the accuracy and 
swiftness of monitoring, the quickness of response, the focusing and magnitude of corrective flows. Effective 
negative feedback loops need to be adaptive: if the impact increases in strength, the feedback has to be 
strengthened too.  
7. The gain around driving positive feedback loops: A positive feedback loop is a self-reinforcing, 
cumulative causation process. They are sources of growth and explosion. Wealth accumulation is one such 
example, where success breeds further success. At the individual level this happens through mechanisms 
such as interest on financial capital, good education and inheritance. At the level of entire economies, working 
versus malfunctioning positive feedback loops distinguish developed from developing economies. Economic 
development is largely about kickstarting a positive cumulative causation process in productive capabilities. 
Seen from a global perspective however positive feedback loops cannot carry on indefinitely as closed 
systems have limits. Erosion and collapse is their final conclusion. Whereas strengthening some positive 
feedback loops may make sense as a transient measure (e.g. in poverty alleviation or in cross-regional /-
country income convergence), in seeking to achieve balance and long-term sustainability it may be more 
effective to seek to weaken the positive feedback loops (e.g. in alleviating poverty among individuals with 
progressive taxes and universal high-quality education). 
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6. The structure of information flows. Missing information feedback and the absence of learning is 
one of the most important causes of system malfunction. Distributing information can improve accountability 
and discourage socially damaging behaviour. Improving the structure of information flows can be difficult, as 
it is often built into physical and social arrangements, but technological and social changes often make them 
possible. Even small changes in information flows can have profound impact. 
5. The rules of the system. The rules of the system define its scope, its boundaries, its degrees of 
freedom. Physical laws such as the second law of thermodynamics are absolute rules; constitutions are 
strong social rules, whereas laws, punishments, incentives and informal social arrangements are 
progressively weaker rules. Rules can have an enormous influence on human behaviour and changes in many 
of these are within the reach of policy planners. 
4. The power to add, change, evolve or self-organise system structure. Technical advance and 
social revolution can transform social systems by creating new structures and behaviours or in systems 
terminology permit them to “self-organise”. The ability to self-organise is the strongest form of system 
resilience. In resilient, long-lived systems self-organisation is not an accident but down to successful rules for 
self-organisation, the most obvious of which are the rules governing evolution through (natural or artificial) 
selection. The enormous genetic diversity encountered in nature, has been the cumulative product of 
evolution spanning countless centuries and is the source of evolutionary potential, just as the diverse 
knowledge found in science libraries, labs, and universities where scientists are trained, are the source of 
technological potential. Allowing a living species to become extinct is damaging to a system, just like 
eradicating knowledge of a particular type of science or particular kinds of scientists. 
3. The goals of the system. Changing a system’s orientation can have profound influence in its long-
term direction and can determine outcomes such as its growth, survival, resilience, differentiation and 
evolution. Whole-system goals do not always correspond to proclamations and are only deducible from 
observing the actual behaviour of the system. Only planners at the very top of a system’s decision-making 
hierarchy have the power to alter the system’s goals, even if partially. 
2. The mindset or paradigm out of which the system arises. A society’s paradigm is a deep set of 
beliefs about how the world works. These beliefs are so well-known to members of a social system that are 
often not deemed worthy of stating and have therefore to be independently discovered by outsider observers. 
Understanding what the paradigm is and designing interventions that are cognisant of its logic, its dynamics 
and limitations is a strong leverage point. Paradigm changes at the level of entire societies are difficult, but 
not impossible, to bring about.  
1. The power to transcend paradigms: The ability to understand that there are paradigms, and that 
just because, from one’s own vantage point, only one paradigm appears dominant, does not mean that it is 
also superior to the limitless possibilities that exist. Promoting this understanding can help systems stay 
unattached in the arena of paradigms and thus derive enormous benefits by commencing an early transition 
to a superior paradigm once it emerges. 
Source: OECD (2015), pp. 47-49, inspired by Meadows (1999). 
 
Governance of government 
b. What can be learnt from past experience in the territory and/or its national context and what 
international experience can be useful?  
Transitions usually require large public infrastructures (e.g. in road transport, waste management 
facilities, energy distribution, urban regeneration) and, crucially, legislation, regulation and transfers 
of authority (OECD, 2015). These all ascribe a major role to government, so effective within-
government coordination is a key pre-condition for success. Changes in both the architecture of the 
systems of governance, changes in organisational culture and changes in individual perspectives 
and expectations are all potential points of leverage (Colgan et al., 2014; OECD, 2017).  
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The multi-level nature of transitions suggests the need to engage not just with regional but also, 
especially, with national authorities. This is not merely about coordination between regional and 
national authorities, but about continuous involvement and engagement at all relevant levels. One 
possibility is for something like an "entrepreneurial discovery process" for government, between 
various ministries/constituencies and levels of government. In achieving the understanding 
necessary to make useful contributions, please consider asking the questions included in Box 13 in 
your interviews with officials from state institutions.  
Box 13. Possible questions to ask during interviews with public officials 
 
b. What role can monitoring and evaluation play in the governance of the transition? 
Evidence, in all its forms (statistics, indicators, studies49, anecdotal experiences etc.), can shape 
frames of thinking and action. Its importance to shared understanding and the alignment of goals 
cannot therefore be overestimated. The ability to gather information on bottlenecks to a transition 
and to act quickly upon it would is crucial to a timely transition. Setting up appropriate mechanisms 
for monitoring and evaluating progress towards a transition's goals is therefore vital. The 
knowledge generated can stimulate collective discussion and learning and feed into the 
development of concrete policies that can advance the transition50. 
There are, however, very different traditions of evaluation in transition management and innovation 
policy, with varying emphases on formative evaluation (including the provision of strategic 
intelligence to transition managers, typically of a qualitative nature) and summative evaluation 
(which places greater emphasis on quantitative measurement and issues such as accountability 
linking policy impacts back to the inputs of government and tax payers). It would be important for 
any suggested mechanisms to tackle the issue of accountability as well as providing advice to 
transition managers. 
                                           
49 The development of economic modelling tools that estimate the impacts of policies for systemic transitions 
can also be useful for ex ante planning, for effective monitoring and ex post evaluation (Varga et al., 
2020). However, the development of such tools is a challenging task. Empirical systems dynamics 
modelling appears to be a suitable option in this regard and is worth further examination. 
50 In many countries Action Plans have become an almost standard means of implementing major policies. The 
Action Plans typically have metrics and targets as their means of monitoring progress. An important point 
is that this monitors progress but does not necessarily evaluate effectiveness, capture lessons or assess 
learning. 
1. What is the experience so far with attempts to coordinate policies across portfolios? Have strategies 
been helpful in advancing similar policy agendas in the past?  
2. How do current coordination mechanisms work and what room is there for improving them without 
changing existing administrative boundaries? 
3. Is there a "natural" state actor (e.g. a ministry/agency or even the Prime Minister's or President's 
office) with a strong political mandate and influence across government that could champion the 
transition vision? What kind of alternative configurations might help? What room is there for redesign of 
administrative boundaries and hierarchies?  
4. What is the role of intrinsic motivation and of incentives within the public administration? Are public 
officials rewarded for experimenting and for collaborating?  
5. What is the balance between formal committees and informal networks of officials? Do meta-
organisations play a role? 
6. How common are informal networks of officials across portfolios? Are they considered a “good” thing? 
Do they form quickly in response to emerging demands and cross-cutting concerns (e.g. a “crisis”)? What 
are the obstacles in their formation?  
7. Are there “pockets” within extended government with a more responsive or adaptive organisational 
culture? What can be learnt from them? 
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c. How can whole-of-government coordination and mobilisation be fostered to realise the vision of 
the transition in view of territorial constraints and opportunities?  
Remember that not everything has to happen at the same time. Some initiatives, actions and 
reforms can happen quite quickly, but in most instances the actors involved will need time to think 
things through fully, to consult and to negotiate, design and implement changes. It is important that 
you position your recommendations for action along a long-term path, focusing on the overall 
direction. A key objective is for political principals, at the regional and national levels, to be engaged 
in relevant policy discussions and to provide, ultimately, a clear-political mandate. See Box 14 with 
some general directions to inspire you in developing your suggestions.  
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Box 14. What is whole-of-government work and how to do it? 
 
Source: Colgan et al. (2014, pp. 4-5) 
What does whole of government work involve?  
Whole of government approaches require a particular way of working, which involves: 
• Joining up at the centre to achieve a shared vision: Whole of government work involves joining up policy-
making at the centre in support of implementation. This is the feature that distinguishes it from interagency work. 
All stakeholders should have the same vision and buy-in to the same strategic priorities; furthermore, they should 
be consulted from the beginning (i.e. at the stage of agenda-setting and policy development). 
• Boundary management: In complex policy implementation, the boundaries between government departments, 
between policy-makers and implementation bodies, and between levels (national and local, policy-makers and 
front-line personnel, administrative and professional personnel) must be managed if implementation is to be 
effective. 
• Managing interdependencies: Whole of government work also involves recognising and managing the 
interdependencies across areas of government and among levels of implementation – national, local, professional 
and administrative. 
• Shared understanding: In the case of deep-seated social problems (so-called ‘wicked’ problems), such as 
poverty, crime or obesity, a shared view among the stakeholders about the underlying causes of the problem is an 
essential foundation for effective whole of government work.  
Doing whole of government work 
Successful whole of government work depends on clear objectives, political commitment, viable joined-up 
Government structures, strong cultures of collaboration and incentives to collaborate. In particular, engaging 
successfully in whole of government work requires: 
• Leadership: A high level of leadership at the political and administrative level is essential for whole of 
government work. Both Ministers and senior public servants need to be committed to the approach. 
• Culture: Whole of government structures are necessary, but not sufficient for effective whole of government work 
– new cultural capacities, cultural readiness and behavioural change are essential. Key cultural capacities include 
the ability to work across boundaries, build strategic alliances and relationships, negotiate, manage complexity and 
capitalise on opportunities afforded by interdependence. 
• New ways of thinking: Whole of government work requires a re-alignment of understandings about goals, roles 
and outcomes, and a shift away from narrower departmental objectives. 
• Networked governance: This involves new forms of accountability, targets, budgetary management systems and 
performance indicators. It also requires a focus on monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation and 
outcomes. 
• Structures that align with purpose: Whole of government teams and other interagency/ interdepartmental 
structures must align with purpose. The more long-term the objective, the greater the need for formal structures. 
Short-term projects may rely on informal arrangements, whereas initiatives aimed at achieving long-term change 
may need more permanent structures, including legislation.  
• New work processes: The work processes that matter most in whole of government work include clear and 
sometimes restructured lines of accountability, budgetary parameters, and roles, risk management systems and 
performance management systems that reward whole of government work and whole of government reporting 
arrangements. 
• Managing ‘gaps’: Core dimensions of the linkages among key actors to be managed as part of a whole of 
government initiative have been termed ‘gaps’ by the OECD (Chabit and Michalun, 2009). These include the 
information gap, the capacity gap, the fiscal gap, the administrative gap and the policy gap.  
• Providing supports: Capacity development initiatives are a feature of whole of government work in several 
countries and include building repositories of shared lessons and experiences, practice guidelines, joint training, 
networking initiatives and access to learning and development supports. 
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A key objective is for political principals, at the national level too, to be engaged and provide a 
clear-political mandate. The degree of within-government coordination required for large-scale 
transitions is difficult to achieve without leadership and sustained impulse at the highest political 
level (e.g. Prime Minister's office) (OECD, 2015; Fagerberg and Hutschenreiter, 2020). Politico-
administrative innovations may be necessary to anchor the vision, strategy and associated action 
plan beyond the electoral cycle. Mission-oriented policy may provide a more stable governance 
framework for coordinating responses from across government (See Box 15). In considering 
whether mission-oriented policy, or some other form of anchoring the long-term orientation of the 
system is more suitable, consider Box 16.  
Box 15. Considerations in the development of mission-oriented policy 
 
Box 16. Differences between visions, missions and targets 
Visions articulate a desired end-state for a particular socio-technical regime (energy, mobility, food) 
supported by an actor network, to guide and motivate processes of technological, institutional and 
behavioural change (Berkhout, 2006). Visions are a means for introducing directionality into policymaking. An 
example is a vision of ‘a resource-efficient and low-carbon energy system’ or ‘a sustainable and flexible 
mobility system’. 
 
Missions identify an opportunity and provide a solution and approach to address societal challenges 
(Mazzucato, 2018). Often used in the innovation and defence policy areas, they create directionality and a 
focus for coordinating activities by different actors, sometimes across sectors. A mission is more specific 
than a vision, often expressing urgency and the need for immediate action. Examples of missions include 
having plastic-free oceans, or 100 carbon-free cities by 2030 (Mazzucato, 2018). 
 
Targets make concrete a vision or a mission, often in quantifiable and measurable terms. In contrast, visions 
and missions can include non-quantifiable or only partially measurable elements and are often less concrete. 
Examples of targets are reduction of energy demand by industry by 50 % by 2030, replacing 30 % of 
combustion engine vehicles with EVs by 2025, or halting the use of non-recyclable single-use plastics by 
2020. 
Source: EEA (2019, p. 107) 
 
Missions focus on concrete problems requiring timely responses and are especially suitable when there is a 
need to coordinate and align extensively. As many of the binding constraints in transformation are outside 
the narrow innovation system, missions call for reconfiguration of production, consumption and even 
governance systems. A mission needs to be broadly understood, bold and inspirational, so it can mobilise 
broad range of stakeholders and people from all walks of life. Concrete problems are broadly understood. 
When defining a mission, it is important to define values and examples of “progress” – i.e. what would be 
“good” and “bad” innovation. 
In missions, impact is the point, not an afterthought, and for this reason, a focus on missions facilitates 
collective measurement and monitoring. Missions can become the arena within which to negotiate and 
resolve tensions between multiple values: economic, social, environmental. They can help focus attention and, 
through improved coordination, may result in a better use of resources, and permit policy harness individual 
agency, and industrial system to derive value from diversity. However, missions cannot effectively aggregate 
existing bottom-up initiatives which are likely to have progresses in fundamentally different (and sometimes 
contradictory) directions: a mission is suitable for starting afresh. 
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Building support coalitions 
d. What stakeholders can form the core of an evolving and growing support coalition for the 
transitions? How to animate, empower and protect such coalitions? 
Building support coalitions is, at least in part, an exercise in fostering grass-root initiatives and 
aggregating niches with the purpose of aligning efforts and exerting greater pressure for 
government to act (Schott and Steinmueller, 2018). Additionally, forging coalitions among currently 
disparate yet powerful interests is even more important51 (Smith et al., 2005), as there is no 
guarantee that they will self-organise in ways compatible with the general interest. It is therefore 
important for government to take on the role of fostering, enlarging, steering and protecting the 
coalition from potential capture by incumbents.   
Consider using the framework proposed in Table 6 to identify the persons (including those outside 
structures of power) who can contribute to defining and promoting the case for transition in the 
territory. That is, building a vision of the future based on common values and narratives and 
engaging the community. It will be necessary to mobilise a diverse group of people with the 
capacity to engage institutions and the relevant parts of the community. It is important to identify 
people with influence on those key constituencies identified as parts of steps 2 and 3. The 
characteristics of the groups depend on the territory and the domain of transition. The members of 
the group are likely to change in line with the demands of a dynamic process and may evolve, 
following the review, towards a movement or a support coalition. 
Table 6. A potential advocacy group 
Person Institution Area/domain of 
expertise 
Influence on the 
affected community 
    
    
    
 
The growth and sustainability of a support coalition will depend on the extent to which the vision is 
embraced broadly. The review can only be but an input to a broad and inclusive discussion about 
the vision. Taking inspiration from Stroh (2015), there are two pre-requisites to the sustainability of 
the support coalition at the outset:  
 To help a broad group of stakeholders understand the challenges and opportunities, shape the 
vision, with a view to articulating it in terms of shared values and an inspiring mission statement;  
 To welcome and harness each stakeholder's experience and willingness to contribute as a way to 
grow the membership of the support coalition, enhance the legitimacy of the transition and increase 
pressure upon those with systemic power to act.  
                                           
51 “A good example of this kind of transition is the history of civil nuclear power. This was widely regarded in the 
1950s and 1960s as a critical technology with the potential to generate broad technological, economic and 
political benefits. A common narrative was developed, which involved a series of technological transitions 
from uranium fuel cycles (with the thermal reactor being the conversion technology) to plutonium fuel 
cycles (with the fast reactor being the conversion technology). Scientific, political, military and industrial 
interests were co-opted to this vision to form a powerful grouping that was typically in strong contention 
with established interests within the incumbent electric system (Gowing, 1974)” (Smith et al., 2005; p. 
1502) 
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Examples of opportunities to harness the willingness of stakeholders to act in support of the 
transition include participatory events [such as those organised in the context of the Entrepreneurial 
Discovery Process (EDP) in S3], voting on actions, documenting and rewarding initiatives (e.g. offer 
the coalition's “seal of approval” to stakeholders who invest in support of the transition), giving 
visibility to businesses and business models that advance the vision etc. The vision can be further 
strengthened if it incorporates social values and objectives that are outside the industrial theme but 
are important to many in the region (e.g. a desire to democratise the economy could be fostered by 
encouraging and co-opting employee-owned enterprises with missions aligned with the transition). 
The experience with the development of “Shared Agendas” offers a concrete example to inspire 
grassroots involvement and commitment to solving territorial problems (Box 17). 
Box 17. Shared agendas for sustainability and social change 
Shared Agendas are collectively agreed plans for territorial transformation in which broad coalitions of 
affected stakeholders commit to specific actions. The recent experience with an emerging methodology of 
shared agendas for sustainability and social change in Catalonia (Fernandez and Romagosa, 2020) offers 
guidelines for long-term coordination. Importantly, Shared Agendas represent a useful tool to follow up the 
momentum generated following a POINT review and make concrete steps in the advancement of the 
identified pathways.   
Shared Agendas are research and innovation-driven transformative agendas that articulate, in a territory, the 
collective action of various actors aimed at addressing a common challenge (usually related to the transition 
towards more sustainable and inclusive development pathways). While Shared Agendas should always be 
adapted to the characteristics of each territory, they nevertheless have some common features.  Share 
Agendas are: 
 Aimed at understanding and managing complex problems from a holistic and dynamic perspective, taking 
into account the long-term effects and the direct and indirect impacts; 
 Based on dialogue and cooperation across sectors for the generation of shared knowledge between 
government, academia, companies and civil society; 
 Organised according to demand, to respond to specific needs and problems of affected social groups in 
the territory, through the co-design of solutions; 
 Focused in action around concrete problems and that foments change, transformation and collective 
impact, that are sustained over time; 
 Managed with governance structures and models that are participatory, using flexible, open and dynamic 
approaches to programming, coordination and evaluation that encourage experimentation, learning and 
adaptability; 
 Bold and designed so that they explore alternative routes, including by experimenting with untested 
approaches and actions, evaluating their impact, integrating lessons, reproducing or scaling up successful 
solutions and linking them to other strategies and agendas (such as the research and innovation missions 
in the European Union’s Horizon Europe). 
 Forward-looking by trying to predict the systemic effects the long-term actions will cause and open so 
they can adapt and respond actively to unexpected effects, developments, achievements and failures. 
Shared Agendas are built and implemented in three steps. 
1. The purpose of the first step, which can begin with a POINT review, is to prepare, with the actors, the 
evidence basis on needs, capabilities and constraints necessary to articulate the shared agenda. This 
involves: 
 Delimiting the challenge in the territory. 
 Identifying the key actors committed to change and establishing an initial advocacy group. 
 Co-developing a shared future vision. 
 Co-developing a shared vision of the current situation, the problems and their causes. 
 Identifying the opportunities (leverage points in the system) on which action is possible and 
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leverage hypotheses that are expected to break the barriers and dynamics that prevent future 
progress or accelerate positive dynamics already operating. 
 Designing an initial governance model. 
2. The second step focuses on the co-design and implementation of policy experiments to find solutions. In 
this step, it is essential to generate meeting spaces where actors in the territory can work together to co-
design possible solutions, implement them, learn from them and generate collective knowledge. 
3. The third step focuses on transformation and social change, that is to say, achieving systemic 
transformation that is sustained over time and contributes to accelerating the transition towards 
sustainability. 
From the outset, a participatory governance model is needed, one that promotes cross-cutting actions, in 
order to secure and maintain the involvement and commitment of the different actors in co-designing, 
implementing and monitoring the shared agenda. Governance mechanisms that ensure the active 
participation of the actors and tools to articulate the collective action and learning are key throughout the 
process. 
Public policies at the national, regional and local spheres play a key role in enabling and guiding these 
transition processes. It is necessary, not only to promote spaces for meeting and cooperation between 
different actors, but also, often, to adapt regulatory frameworks. Moreover, new incentives, new forms of 
financing and new ways of managing shared risk are needed. Governments also play a key role ensuring that 
these transformative initiatives are equitable and fair in economic, social and environmental terms. 
This methodology for shared agendas is being tested in Catalonia in the framework of the smart 
specialisation strategy through the following pilot projects: 
 The challenge for the Biolab Ponent shared agenda (a rural territory) is to change the current 
model of production and consumption to one based on the green and circular economy in order to 
capture the potential social, economic and environmental benefits of this transformation by 
capitalising on local resources and articulating effective responses to socioeconomic problems in the 
territory. 
 In the Bages shared agenda, the articulation of bottom-up collaborative innovative solutions to 
the needs and problems related to dependent people is becoming a driver for social transformation 
and for new business opportunities that generate economic and social value (many of them 
technology-based: 3D, robotics, telemedicine, telecare, etc.).   
 The challenge for the B-30 territory shared agenda (industrial area) is to organise a responsible 
research and innovation ecosystem that can help to transform the current production and 
consumption system to a circular economy model that capitalises on local resources and articulates 
effective responses to socio-economic problems in the territory. 
In all these shared agendas, responsible research and innovation is the main driver for generating new jobs 
and business opportunities and for advancing towards more sustainable and inclusive pathways. 
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Shared agendas in 3 steps  
 
Source: Adapted from Fernandez and Romagosa (2020) 
 
Understanding and managing resistance to change 
e. What are the reasons for delaying the transition? What constituencies might form an opposition 
and what parts of them are likely to succeed in opposing the transition? 
It is important to distinguish between passive (due to inertia) and active resistance to change. 
International experience suggests that resistance to change can be conscious and adaptive. It is 
important to understand the perspective of those who (are likely) to resist. Insofar as they form part 
of the sunset regime to be phased out it would be important to find ways for the vision (or its 
associated compensatory actions) to embrace their concerns and co-opt them. It is important to 
define as concretely as possible the most capable, and therefore the most likely to succeed, 
stakeholders who might resit the transition. 
Defining reforms, policies, instruments and experiments 
f. What kinds of reforms policies and specific instruments appear appropriate in advancing the 
vision of the transition developed in Step 3? How can the S3 strategy be enriched to contribute to 
the vision? 
This is where much of the immediate value of the visioning exercise in Step 3 is extracted. Taking 
the vision as indicative of the overall direction permits a focused search and identification of 
immediate concrete actions. Reforms, policies and instruments that span the range of innovation 
policy can spearhead the transition. The territory's S3 strategy and its associated actions (see Table 
8 for a menu for choice) would be a starting point upon which to build and enrich. An obvious 
contribution would be the definition (or refinement) of one or more S3 priorities on the transition's 
theme. A key practical outcome for lagging regions in particular as a result of the review would be 
as an input to an enhanced S3 strategy that achieves the coordination of several thematic 
objectives in EU Structural Funds and amplifies their impact. The vision should point the way to 
complementarities between thematic objectives addressing research and innovation that have been 
orchestrated in the current programming period under the S3 framework and the remaining 
1. Understand the challenge and 
prepare the basis for collective action
2. Co-design and test innovative 
solutions through a shared agenda
3. Achieve systemic impact: advance 
towards the shared vision
2.1. Co-design and test 
new solutions to the problems 
identified
3.1. Reproduce and scale up 
the solutions tested
1.1. Delimit the
challenge in the territory
1.2. Create an advocacy group
1.3. Define a shared future vision
1.4. Define a shared vision of the
current situation
1.5. Specify the priorities of the
agenda
1.6. Establish an initial
governance model
Involve relevant actors and strengthen their commitment to the shared future vision
Develop the governance model and support tools for collective action, monitoring and strategic learning
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thematic objectives and funds covering large physical infrastructures, environmental sustainability, 
education and training and social cohesion. 
Table 7. Tool box for implementation and refinement of S3 
Objective Tool Description 
Idea generation, trust 
building and support 
quadruple helix 
cooperation  
EDP focus group 
methodology  
Step-by-step approach to identify or refine S3 priorities involving the 
quadruple helix  
Open up to wider (online) 
communities  
Online stakeholder 
engagement  
Online tool for spreading information to wider groups of stakeholders. 
Can be used for idea prioritisation, partnership formation, online idea 
development, etc.  
Address brain drain and 
build skills  
Mobility Working Group  
Bottom-up approach to develop a joint strategy and roadmap for 
increasing cross- sectoral and international mobility. It can also be 
widened to cover other types of skill development. Critical elements 
include both joint development and joint implementation by all actors 
involved.  
Increase coordination 
between national and 
regional level  
Methodology Project 
Development Lab 1 
(PDL1)  
Coordinated approach to analyse fundability, duplication and 
administrative and legal and state aid issues of business ideas involving 
relevant national and regional level administrations  
Widen funding sources to 
draw on for idea 
implementation  
Methodology Project 
Development Lab 2 
(PDL2)  
Specific advice from national contact points on the use of alternative 
funding sources for specific ideas  
Online Research, 
Development and 
Innovation (R&D&I) 
Funding Guide  
Online overview of available funding sources  
Case descriptions  
Examples of further developed ideas illustrating the potential use of 
different funding sources to support implementation  
Implement or optimise a 
S3 governance structure  
Governance working 
group  
Bottom-up approach to develop or refine a joint strategy and roadmap 
for a S3 governance structure. Critical elements include both joint 
development and joint implementation by all actors involved.  
Support ongoing 
stakeholder engagement  Stakeholder round table 
discussions  
Well-orchestrated stakeholder discussions centred on specific discussion 
topics.  
Identification of barriers 
and systemic failures and 
possible solutions  Tailored peer review 
events  
Adaptation from the traditional approach to peer learning. Peer regions 
critically review one specific region, based on an identification of key 
bottlenecks in RIS3 implementation  
Mutual learning  
Board of critical friends  
International group of experts from different backgrounds (peers, 
business, academia) reflect on methodology, thematic priorities and 
related implementation issues  
Support to international 
cooperation  
Collaboration spotting 
tool (developed through 
CERN-JRC collaboration) 
Quantitative visualisation tool for identifying potential international R&D 
partners in specific cooperation areas 
Develop the potential of 
Key Enabling Technologies 
(KETs) in S3 
KET value chain analysis 
Analysis of the potential contribution of KETs along the whole value 
chain of a thematic area, including supported functions, expected 
benefits and other knowledge supply synergies. Example developed for 
Information and communications technology (ICT) along the value chain 
of non-metallic minerals 
KET contribution and 
knowledge mapping at 
idea level 
Analysis at detailed level of granularity of KET potential and required 
related knowledge and partners. Example developed for ICT for a series 
of business ideas. 
Source: Boden et al. (2016: pp. 12-13) 
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Remember that the transition will not happen solely by way of projects – while projects will be 
needed to trail-blaze some of the transition paths, their very viability will depend on the ability of 
national and regional authorities to reframe the problem and respond quickly to the demands of the 
transition. This will inevitably include the need to legislate and (de-) regulate old and new industries, 
to adapt labour laws, to regulate land use, to offer the full range of policy instruments including 
fiscal incentives, and to consider transfers of authority to dedicated agencies etc. In other words, 
the needs for actions to manage industrial transition include all actions that can be considered 
industrial policies. These include things that go beyond tax and spend instruments and include tools 
that favour market formation, such as quota requirements for producers and emission-trading 
schemes.  
Table 8 provides some examples of policy tools to facilitate transition in energy production and use 
in particular. There is an extensive literature on new industrial policies (e.g. see Warwick, 2013 
Andreoni and Scazzieri, 2013; Andreoni, 2016; Chang and Andreoni, 2020) and policies for the 
promotion of sustainability (e.g. see Kemp and Never, 2017; Geels et al., 2017; EEA, 2019) that 
details a range of approaches and instruments that could help. The challenge will be to match them 
to the constraints of the territory and to the portfolios of government actors that have participated 
in the review. 
Table 8. Selected policy tools for reorientation of energy investment 
Type of solution/transition 
path  
Typical policy tools to 
facilitate investment 
Other measures that can 
affect future investment 
decisions 
Utility-scale renewables Auctions for long-term power 
purchase agreements; portfolio 
standards; tradable certificates 
Carbon pricing; long-term 
arrangements with modulated 
market premiums 
Distributed generation 
(e.g. rooftop photovoltaics) 
Feed-in tariffs and net metering Carbon pricing; retail electricity 
tariff design; minimum building 
performance standards 
Coal-to-gas switch and biomass 
power 
Carbon pricing; minimum 
performance standards 
Rules for export credits and 
multilateral financing; financial 
disclosure rules 
CCS in industry and power Grants to cover additional costs of 
CCS; CO2 storage tax credits 
Carbon pricing; CO2 infrastructure 
deployment; minimum 
performance standards 
Industrial energy efficiency Utility obligations; energy 
efficiency auctions; mandatory 
efficiency opportunity audits 
Carbon pricing; minimum 
performance standards; 
elimination of energy subsidies 
Buildings and appliances 
efficiency 
Minimum performance standards; 
utility obligations; property tax 
repayment schemes; public 
procurement; tradable certificates; 
revolving funds 
Energy performance certificates; 
performance data transparency; 
energy 
services companies 
Vehicle efficiency and EVs Fuel economy standards; fuel and 
vehicle taxation 
Differential road pricing and 
congestion 
policies; elimination of consumer 
fuel 
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subsidies 
Vehicle efficiency and EVs Purchase subsidies; charging 
infrastructure deployment; 
tradable credits; fleet average fuel 
economy standards; exemptions 
from traffic fees 
Differential road pricing; parking 
restrictions; minimum 
performance 
standards 
Source: EEA (2019, p. 101) 
 
g. What would an appropriate policy mix for the transition look like in the short-, medium- and long-
run? How should policies be sequenced? Can some policies be tailored to specific constituencies?  
The report should organise the various policy suggestions into a policy mix. The policy mix should be 
differentiated across the main aggregate sectors covered by the review and appropriately 
sequenced. For example, for any given industrial theme, the territory’s businesses can be distributed 
across the cells in Table 9 according to their productive and innovation capabilities. On one end, 
some businesses will have world class productive capabilities and be routinely engaged in new-to-
the-world innovation. On the other end, other businesses will have basic or no productive 
capabilities and can only be realistically engaged in innovation that is new-to-the-firm or new-to-
the-territory. Public support should be appropriately tailored for parts of the business sector that 
correspond to the various combinations of innovation and productive capability.  
The policy mix should also be appropriately sequenced, progressing steadily from one step to 
another, as “leap-frogging” cannot be the basis of a dependable industrial policy. For the territory as 
a whole, at least three stages of development of industrial capabilities can be discerned within this 
taxonomy for any given theme. First, progress from a situation where the predominance of industry 
in the territory has basic or no productive capabilities in the theme (column A), to a situation where 
at least some firms are nationally competitive (column B). Second, progress from a situation where 
the predominance of industry has nationally relevant production capabilities (column B), to a 
situation where a sizeable share of production is destined for international export (column C). And, 
finally, if the process of capability accumulation can be sustained, the business sector may 
graduate to a systematically innovative, export-led industrial ecosystem that becomes an 
international reference point in the given theme. As production capability is jointly developed with 
innovation capability, a key role of policy will be to support progressively more ambitious forms of 
innovation (from tier I, to tier II and then tier III in Table 9). A similarly staggered approach may be 
necessary in promoting the environmental sustainability of industry. A lot can be learned in that 
respect from the long experience of industrial transition in cleaner production (e.g. a ladder of 
business-environment, from ‘compliance’ to ‘sustainable firms’). (Ravetz 2000). Careful tailoring of 
industrial policies, and updating of the policy mix over time to both match the combination of 
production-innovation capability of the territory and anticipate the next stage in its development, 
will be important. 
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Table 9. Public support for production and innovation capabilities  
…business sector 
is predominantly 
characterised by… 
 
A. Basic or no 
production 
capabilities 
B. Nationally 
relevant production 
capabilities 
C. Internationally 
relevant production 
capabilities 
D. World class 
production 
capabilities 
                  (Stars denote intensity of policy attention / need for public support) 
III. New-to-the-
world innovation 
capabilities 
(shifting global 
frontier) 
  
N/A 
(“High tech fantasies”) 
 
** 
 
* * * 
 
* * * 
II. New-to-the-
market 
innovation 
capabilities (edge 
vs current 
competitors) 
 
* 
 
* * * 
 
* * 
 
N/A 
(no additionality) 
I. New-to-the-
firm or new-to-
the-territory 
innovation 
capabilities (local 
problem solving) 
 
* * * 
 
* 
 
N/A 
(no additionality) 
 
N/A 
(no additionality) 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
i. What could be appropriate policy experiments in view of the vision at hand and the territory's 
binding constraints (including resources)? How could it be financed? 
The policy experiments in particular should be not just the outcome of reflection and analysis by the 
experts, but should be co-developed with the authorities (so that they can be realistic) and the JRC 
(so that they draw from international experience). In identifying suitable experiments you are also 
encouraged to consult the territory's portfolio of S3 calls and projects and associated policy 
intelligence for inspiration. Some desirable features of an ideal policy experiment are mention in 
Box 18. Unlike the overall vision which should be pragmatic (and at high-level of aggregation at 
least predictably concrete in order to be credible), experimental policies/pilots allow room for testing 
bold new solutions, drawing from cutting edge science and technology too. As argued by Schot and 
Steinmueller (2018): 
“Experiments demand that actors embrace uncertainty and accept failure as part of the learning 
process, focus on articulation of new shared expectations and visions the building of new networks, 
and the shaping of new markets (called niches) which eventually will challenge dominant practices 
in mainstream markets and institutions.” 
Box 18. Policy experiments 
Desirable features of an ideal policy experiment include: 
 
 Low-cost and designed in such a way that it produces clear signals of its success or failure quickly; 
 Scalable and replicable, so that, if successful, it can be supported quickly; 
 Targeted on a lever of change that is near a tipping point (e.g. in the diffusion of a key technology) 
and where even small interventions stand to make a big difference; 
 Ambitious, even risky, in trying out solutions that promise large gains; 
 Requiring a solution that the market is unlikely to provide at short notice, but which may, if 
successful, become a viable business model; 
 Reinforces the legitimacy of the transition (e.g. by strengthening support coalitions, or helping raise 
awareness about the benefits of specific solutions); 
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 Includes elements of both technological and organisational or social innovation that upset existing 
behavioural patterns, and address imbalances in systemic power (e.g. by democratising energy 
production; or demonstrating the viability of community-based business models); 
 Fosters virtuous cycles between emerging and declining sectors and technologies. e.g. by re-skilling 
workers in sunset industries or by helping incumbent firms diversify into new markets within the 
transition regime. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the policy experiment does not have to be based on a project or 
technological competence. The experiment may rather test out organisational innovations and 
support novel business models. It may well emerge from pre-existing community effort to address 
a territorial problem, such as social exclusion, and exclusion from labour markets and from formal 
entrepreneurship. In that case, the experiment may be about testing how well existing models that 
have proved their worth within protected niches can be scaled up and replicated. One promising 
direction for dealing with interrelated long-lasting problems are Community-Based Enterprises (CBE) 
(see Box 19). 
 
Box 19. Community-based Enterprises 
Community-based Enterprises (CBE) are a promising approach to tackling poverty and social exclusion, by 
providing a direct solution to the interlinked problems of informality, long-term unemployment, and lack of 
skills acquired by experience. CBEs have been defined as: “a community acting corporately as both 
entrepreneur and enterprise in pursuit of the common good.” (Peredo and Chrisman, 2006, p. 310). Gibson et 
al. (2019) mention some of their key features: 
 
 community owned: assets belong to the community and/or the workers; 
 community-led: people with direct concern over the CBE’s local impacts play a leading role; 
 community controlled: community representation in management, ensures local accountability; 
 financial profits or other forms of surplus are re-invested or distributed to the community; 
 socially and environmentally responsible: tackle interrelated social and environmental 
problems; 
 financially self-sustaining or with a credible plan for achieving that goal.  
 
Factors of success include the extent to which the communities have a sense of shared locality, common 
identity (e.g. on account of their former profession or shared social challenge), kinship or other form of strong 
association. Contrarily, it is open to question whether CBEs can be effective in communities that do not have 
a shared experience of cooperation (e.g. refugees) (Peredo and Chriman, 2006).  
 
Policies designed to support CBEs have taken the form of support for skills and entrepreneurship, such as the 
International Labour Organization’s “Community-Based Entrepreneurship Programme” (for a training manual 
see www.cb-tools.org; ILO, 2012), and the provision of finance, through government lending orequity funding 
(see examples in OECD, 2019b, p. 179-181) 
 
 
The policy experiment itself should be seen as a new form of transformative governance, not just a 
technical pilot (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). It needs to be both participatory and iterative: 
participatory in the sense that it can both be shaped by and shape users; and iterative in that its 
ambition can grow as a function of its success and its growing reach can stimulate broader 
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transformations in complementary aspects of the system. These are characteristics that are in 
keeping with the policy experiment's transformative governance purpose (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Innovation trajectory emerging from the co-evolution of projects, frames, 
coordination and learning 
 
Source: Geels and Raven 2006: 739 (cited in OECD, 2015)  
Outcomes/findings of this step: 
 A discussion (10 pages) of the drivers and obstacles in the transition from the existing to the 
imagined system. This should include levers of change. 
 Recommendations along each off the four axes (i.e. governance of government; building support 
coalitions; managing resistance to change; defining policies, instruments, reforms and policy 
experiments -10 pages). The discussion on the fourth axis should include a brief outline of a proposal 
for a policy experiment, co-defined with the authorities. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The reviews can make an important contribution to the successful preparation of each territory’s 
transition, helping them develop actions compatible with the corresponding ex ante fulfilment 
criterion of good governance. However, the successful management of the transition is a much 
broader and longer-term process. For one, the development pathways pointed at in the reviews will 
require confirmation and broader deliberation before they can enjoy legitimacy. The specific 
governance solutions that can sustain this process beyond the reviews are the subject of ongoing 
reflection within the context of the UMIT Working Group. At the very least, it is clear that the 
evidence basis provided by a review can contribute to a systemically-informed and much more 
inclusive Entrepreneurial Discovery Process. 
The POINT guidelines have been designed with a great variety of possible transitions in mind. In that 
respect, they are flexible and can be readily adapted to various contexts and needs for evidence 
collection. Flexibility however inevitably means that gaps will emerge during their application to 
different transition cases. The appropriate level of granularity at which to offer advice is difficult to 
ascertain at the outset: too much detail and the guidelines become inflexible; too little and 
otherwise discoverable links, relations and actions may be missed. For aspects not covered by the 
guidelines, the experts will have to exercise judgment. Insofar as the choices made are in keeping 
with the concepts outlined in this report, pay due attention to the need for a sufficiently broad 
framing, and to the rationales for the reviews, each review should make a useful contribution to a 
territory’s preparation.  
On a final note, it should be remembered that a review is an instrument in support of transitions 
and the methodology adopted is currently in part of a pilot phase. Answers to uncertainties inherent 
in the methodology can only be provided by testing it out in practice and by finding ways to link it to 
existing policy processes and reform drives. The lessons from the reviews underway in Greece, 
Andalusia, Bulgaria and Romania will therefore be invaluable in refining the approach and 
methodology over time. 
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Annex – Review Report Structure 
 
Findings and Recommendations (Executive Summary) 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and coverage 
 Reasons for the transition (global windows of opportunity / regional challenges) 
 System definition and boundaries 
 Transition endpoint and headline target 
Chapter 2 – The current system: Actors, mechanisms, relations and framework conditions 
 Orientation and planning 
 Resource mobilisation 
 Production 
 Consumption/Use 
(+ Diagrams showing relations within each sub-system and between them) 
Chapter 3 – The desired system: Actors, mechanisms, relations and framework conditions 
 Orientation and planning 
 Resource mobilisation 
 Production 
 Consumption/Use 
(+ Diagrams showing relations within each sub-system and between them) 
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